




Budget Deﬁcits, National 
Saving, and Interest Rates
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF the aggregate effects of fiscal policy dates back
at least to the work of David Ricardo. Modern academic interest was 
reinvigorated by the work of Robert Barro and others and by the emergence
of large U.S. federal budget deficits in the 1980s and early 1990s.1 The
result was a substantial amount of research, which is summarized in sev-
eral excellent surveys.2 The rapid but short-lived transition to budget sur-
pluses in the late 1990s, followed by the sharp reversal in budget outcomes
since 2000, has raised interest in this topic again.
Economists tend to view the aggregate effects of ﬁscal policy from one
of three perspectives. To sharpen the distinctions among them, it is helpful
to consider a deficit induced by a lump-sum tax cut today followed by a
lump-sum tax increase in the future, holding the path of government pur-
chases and marginal tax rates constant. Under the Ricardian equivalence
hypothesis proposed by Barro, such a deficit will be fully offset by an
increase in private saving, as taxpayers recognize that the tax is merely
postponed, not canceled. The offsetting increase in private saving means
that the deficit will have no effect on national saving, interest rates,
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2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:14  Page 101exchange rates, future domestic production, or future national income. A
second model, the small open economy view, suggests that budget deﬁcits
do reduce national saving but, at the same time, induce increased capital
inﬂows from abroad that ﬁnance the entire reduction. As a result, domes-
tic production does not decline and interest rates do not rise, but future
national income falls because of the added burden of servicing the increased
foreign debt. A third model, which we call the conventional view, likewise
holds that deﬁcits reduce national saving but that this reduction is at least
partly reﬂected in lower domestic investment. In this model, budget deﬁcits
partly crowd out private investment and partly increase borrowing from
abroad; the combined effect reduces future national income and future
domestic production. The reduction in domestic investment in this model
is brought about by an increase in interest rates, thus establishing a con-
nection between deﬁcits and interest rates.
We emphasize throughout this paper that the relationship between
deﬁcits and national saving is central to the analysis of the economic effects
of ﬁscal policy. National saving, which is the sum of private and govern-
ment saving, finances national investment, which is the sum of domestic
investment and net foreign investment.3 The accumulation of assets,
whether located in the United States or abroad, associated with national
saving means that the capital stock owned by Americans rises. The returns
to those additional assets raise the income of Americans in the future.
An increase in the budget deficit reduces national saving unless it 
is fully offset by an increase in private saving. If national saving falls,
national investment and future national income must fall as well, all else
equal. Therefore, to the extent that budget deficits reduce national sav-
ing, they reduce future national income. This reduction occurs even if
there is no increase in domestic interest rates. In that case the reduction
in national saving associated with budget deficits manifests itself solely
in increased borrowing from abroad (the outcome under the small open
economy view). This is the sense in which the effect of deficits on inter-
est rates and exchange rates (which distinguishes the small open econ-
omy view from the conventional view) is subsidiary to the question of the
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3. Domestic investment represents the accumulation of assets in a country by both its
own residents and foreigners. Net foreign investment is the accumulation of assets abroad
by residents less the accumulation of assets in the home country by foreigners. The sum of
the two is just the accumulation of assets, by residents, in the home country and abroad. This
sum must equal national saving.
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answer than the other two).
A key objective of this paper is to generate tests of the empirical effects
of budget deﬁcits on national saving and interest rates and therefore to help
distinguish among the three models empirically. We test the Ricardian
view against the small open economy and conventional views by estimat-
ing the effect on national saving of budget deficits associated with tax
reductions, after controlling for government purchases, transfers, marginal
tax rates, and other factors. Our empirical results imply that an increase
in the budget deficit substantially reduces national saving: specifically,
after controlling for other factors, a one-dollar increase in the deficit
reduces national saving by between 50 and 80 cents. This suggests that
the Ricardian view is not a good approximation to reality.
We then test the small open economy view against the conventional view
by examining whether deﬁcits affect interest rates. Our results suggest that
the emergence of larger projected budget deﬁcits raises long-term interest
rates in the United States. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a sustained increase in
the projected uniﬁed deﬁcit equal to 1 percent of GDP raises interest rates
by 25 to 35 basis points,4 and a sustained increase of that magnitude in the
projected primary deﬁcit (the uniﬁed deﬁcit excluding interest payments)
raises interest rates by 40 to 70 basis points. Indeed, despite a rancorous pub-
lic debate, there appears to be a surprising degree of convergence in recent
estimates of the effects of ﬁscal policy on interest rates: results from a vari-
ety of econometric studies imply that an increase in the uniﬁed deﬁcit of 
1 percent of GDP, sustained over ten years, would raise interest rates by 30
to 60 basis points. This estimated relationship between deﬁcits and interest
rates not only provides further evidence against the Ricardian view, but also
implies that the conventional view is a better description of reality for the
United States than the small open economy view.
A second objective of the paper is to apply these ﬁndings to an analysis
of recent and proposed or expected future ﬁscal policy actions. Under plau-
sible assumptions described below, the uniﬁed deﬁcit over the next decade
will average about 3.5 percent of GDP. Our estimates imply that such
deﬁcits will reduce national saving over that period by between 2 and 3 per-
cent of GDP. Therefore, after ten years, assets held by Americans will be
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4. Except where stated otherwise, “deﬁcit” refers to the uniﬁed deﬁcit, which includes the
deﬁcit or surplus in Social Security and Medicare and net interest payments.
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rate of return on capital in the range of 6 percent, this implies that national
income will be between 1 and 2 percent lower on an ongoing basis by 2015.
This suggests that current ﬁscal policy trends will exert a signiﬁcant drag on
future economic performance and living standards. In addition, our esti-
mated interest rate effects imply that making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts per-
manent would raise interest rates by enough to raise the cost of capital for
new investment even after taking account of the direct effects of the tax cuts,
which means that long-term investment and economic growth would fall.
The ﬁrst section of the paper describes recent historical patterns and cur-
rent projections for the federal debt, deficits, and their components. The
second section provides a framework for evaluating ﬁscal policy by com-
paring the three models identified above and by discussing several other
ways in which deﬁcits can affect economic performance. The third section
provides a preliminary empirical analysis, whose results generally support
the conventional view, and gives a sense of the magnitude of the effects of
fiscal policy under the conventional approach in a simplified model. The
fourth section examines the effects of deﬁcits on aggregate consumption,
and the ﬁfth section explores the links between deﬁcits and interest rates.
We conclude by discussing some of the implications of our ﬁndings.
Fiscal Policy: Trends and Projections
The federal budget deficit in any year can be measured in a variety of
ways; the most appropriate measure is likely to depend on the particular
model or application of interest. The most widely used measure, the uni-
fied budget balance, is fundamentally a cash-flow metric that includes
both the Social Security and the non–Social Security components of the
federal budget. To a first approximation, the unified balance shows the
extent to which the federal government borrows or lends in credit markets
during the year.5 For some purposes it is more informative to examine the
primary budget balance, which excludes net interest payments. Another
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5. The unified budget is not recorded entirely on a cash-flow basis, and so the unified
deﬁcit does not precisely match the increase in debt held by the public. For example, only
the subsidy cost of direct loan transactions is now recorded in the uniﬁed budget. The gov-
ernment must, however, ﬁnance the full value of the loan. This factor causes the uniﬁed bud-
get deﬁcit to be smaller than the increase in debt held by the public.
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the business cycle and certain special items.6 We focus primarily on these
traditional cash-flow measures. In particular, although we recognize the
importance of the implicit debt created by promises of future government
benefits, we do not incorporate these promises directly into our analysis,
in part because historical time series of this accrued debt are not generally
available, and in part because it is unclear how the market and households
value this implicit debt relative to the government’s explicit debt.7
Figure 1 shows the surplus or deﬁcit in the federal uniﬁed budget and in
the standardized budget, both since 1962, as reported by the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO).8 Both measures clearly show an increase in the
deﬁcit relative to GDP in the early and mid-1980s, a dramatic correction
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6. These include losses due to deposit insurance, receipts from auctions of licenses to
use the electromagnetic spectrum, timing adjustments, and the contributions of the United
States’ allies for Operation Desert Storm (the 1991 Gulf war; Congressional Budget Ofﬁce,
“The Cyclically Adjusted and Standardized Budget Measures,” September 2004).
7. Auerbach and others (2003) discuss the relationship among the cash-ﬂow measures,
accrual accounting, generational accounting, and other ways of measuring the ﬁscal status
of the government.
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Sources: Congressional Budget Office, “The Cyclically Adjusted and Standardized Budget Measures” (September 2004).
Figure 1. Actual and Standardized Federal Budget Balance, 1962–2004
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2000. In ﬁscal 2004 the uniﬁed deﬁcit was 3.6 percent of potential GDP,
and the standardized deﬁcit about 2.5 percent. As the ﬁgure shows, deﬁcits
of this magnitude are large relative to historical norms. Even so, the cur-
rent budget situation would not be a concern if future ﬁscal prospects were
auspicious. Unfortunately, those prospects are in fact dismal.
The top line in figure 2 shows the CBO’s baseline projections for the
deﬁcit in the uniﬁed budget as of September 2004.9The projections assume
that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts expire as scheduled. Summing the annual
projections results in a ten-year baseline uniﬁed budget deﬁcit of $2.3 tril-
lion, or 1.5 percent of cumulative GDP over that period, for ﬁscal 2005 to
2014, with the deﬁcits shrinking over time.
This baseline projection is intended to provide a benchmark for legisla-
tive purposes. It is explicitly not intended to be a projection of actual or
likely budget outcomes or a measure of the ﬁnancial status of the federal
government.10 Thus adjustments to the baseline are required to generate a
106 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
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Source: Authors’ calculations using Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update” (Septem-
ber 2004), and the TPC Microsimulation Model.
a. Debt service is imputed using the CBO interest matrix.
b. Assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent and other expiring tax provisions (except the 2002 tax cuts) 
extended, and that the AMT is indexed for inﬂation and dependent exemptions are allowed under the AMT.
Figure 2. Federal Budget Balance, Projected 2004–14a
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of the government’s ﬁnancial situation.11 One concern is that the baseline
assumes that all temporary tax provisions expire as scheduled, even though
most have been routinely extended in the past. Traditionally, this concern
only applied to a small set of policies—such as tax credits for work oppor-
tunity or for research and experimentation—that have existed for years, are
narrow in scope, and have relatively minor budget costs, and for which
extensions occur as a matter of routine. In recent years, however, the dis-
tortion created by assuming that all temporary tax provisions will expire as
scheduled has grown dramatically, because all of the provisions of the
tax cuts in each of the years 2001 through 2004 are scheduled to expire by
the end of the decade. These “temporary” provisions are quite different in
nature and scope from the other expiring provisions. Whether they will be
extended is a major ﬁscal policy choice, not a matter of routine.12
A second concern is that revenue from the alternative minimum tax
(AMT) grows dramatically under the baseline, a development that few
observers regard as plausible.13Finally, the baseline uses cash-ﬂow account-
ing, which is appropriate for many programs, but which can distort the
ﬁnancial status of programs whose liabilities increase substantially outside
the projection period.14
Adjusting for these factors has an enormous impact on the ten-year
budget projections. Figure 2 shows that, if the 2001, 2002, and 2003 tax
cuts are made permanent, if the other expiring tax provisions are extended,
and if the AMT problem is resolved (by indexing the AMT for inflation
and allowing dependent exemptions, which would still leave 5 million
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10. CBO, “The Economic and Budget Outlook,” January 2004.
11. See Auerbach and others (2003) for an extended discussion of these issues.
12. See Gale and Orszag (2003b) for further discussion of the expiring provisions, and
Gale and Orszag (2004a) on the effects of making the tax cuts permanent.
13. See Burman, Gale, and Rohaly (2003) for discussion of AMT projections and trends.
14. Another concern is that the baseline holds real discretionary spending constant over
time. In a growing economy with an expanding population and evolving security needs, this
assumption is not credible. But the September 2004 projections contain offsetting biases for
discretionary spending that roughly cancel out. In particular, the baseline includes the recent
supplemental spending authority for military expenditures in Iraq, which is unlikely to per-
sist for an entire decade. Removing the supplemental and adjusting the spending level for
population results in a ten-year outlay total that is about the same as that in the baseline, and
so we simply adopt the ofﬁcial baseline ﬁgures for discretionary spending.
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deﬁcit would remain at approximately 3.5 percent of GDP over the decade
and would be 3.7 percent of GDP (almost $700 billion) in 2014.15
One way to gauge the implications of the adjusted unified baseline is
to examine the implied ratio of public debt to GDP, as is done in figure 3.
Under the adjusted baseline, the debt-GDP ratio would rise steadily
throughout the decade and by 2014 would equal 52 percent, well above
the most recent high of 49 percent in 1992, and the highest level since
1956. The debt-GDP ratio would continue to rise thereafter.
The ratio of marketable public debt to GDP tells only part of the long-
term budget story, however. Social Security, Medicare part A (the hospi-
tal insurance program), and government employee pension programs are
projected to run surpluses over the next decade but face shortfalls in the
long term. One way to control for these effects is to examine the ten-year
108 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
15. These ﬁgures include the cost of extending the bonus depreciation provision as spec-
iﬁed in the 2003 tax law. Some ambiguity surrounds whether this temporary measure will
be extended; its extension was not proposed in the administration’s ﬁscal 2005 budget. If this
provision were not extended past its sunset at the end of 2004, the deficit over the decade












Source: Authors’ calculations using Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, “The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update” (Septem-
ber 2004), OMB, and the TPC Microsimulation Model.
a. Debt service is imputed using the CBO interest matrix.
b. Assumes that the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts are made permanent and other expiring tax provisions (except the 2002 tax cuts) 
extended, and that the AMT is indexed for inﬂation and dependent exemptions are allowed under the AMT.
Figure 3. Public Debt, 1950–2014a
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get. For example, the bottom line in ﬁgure 2 shows that, omitting the retire-
ment trust funds, the rest of the budget would face deﬁcits of 5.1 percent
of GDP over the decade (and 5.3 percent of GDP in 2014) under the
assumptions above.
An alternative way to incorporate the entitlement programs is to extend
the time horizon of the analysis so that future shortfalls are included. To do
this, we report estimates of the ﬁscal gap, deﬁned as the immediate and per-
manent increase in taxes or reduction in noninterest expenditure that would
be required to establish the same debt-GDP ratio in the long run as holds
currently.16 In an article co-written with Alan Auerbach, we estimate that,
under adjustments similar to those made in ﬁgure 2, the nation faces a long-
term ﬁscal gap in 2004 of 7.2 percent of GDP through 2080 and 10.5 per-
cent of GDP on a permanent basis.17 Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters
have made similar projections, as has the Bush administration.18
The main drivers of the ﬁscal gap, under the above assumptions, are the
revenue losses from making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent and 
the growth in spending for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. The
recent tax cuts, if extended and not eroded over time by the AMT, would
cost roughly 2 percent of GDP over the long term.19 To help put these ﬁg-
ures in context, over the next seventy-five years the actuarial deficit in
Social Security is 0.7 percent of GDP under the Social Security trustees’
assumptions, and 0.4 percent of GDP under new projections issued by the
CBO.20 The deﬁcit in Medicare part A is 1.4 percent of GDP over the next
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 109
16. See Auerbach (1994). Over an infinite planning horizon, the requirement is equiv-
alent to assuming that the debt-GDP ratio does not explode. Alternatively, the adjustments
set the present value of all future primary surpluses equal to the current value of the
national debt, where the primary surplus is the difference between revenue and noninterest
expenditure.
17. Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2004). In perhaps more familiar terms, the primary
deﬁcit would be 4.1 percent of GDP in 2030, 5.5 percent in 2060, and 5.8 percent by 2080;
the uniﬁed deﬁcit would rise much faster because of accruing interest payments: it would be
13 percent of GDP in 2030, 37 percent by 2060, and 64 percent by 2080. Public debt would
be 139 percent of GDP in 2030, 505 percent in 2060, and 942 percent in 2080.
18. Gokhale and Smetters (2003); Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the
United States Government: Fiscal Year 2005 Budget.
19. Gale and Orszag (2004a).
20. CBO, “The Outlook for Social Security,” June 2004. The actuarial deﬁcit in Social
Security over an inﬁnite horizon amounts to 1.2 percent of GDP over that horizon under the
trustees’ assumptions.
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cuts would reduce revenue over the next seventy-ﬁve years by an amount
about as large as the entire shortfall in the Social Security and Medicare
part A trust funds over the same period.
Even if the tax cuts are not made permanent, however, the fiscal gap
would be 5.1 percent of GDP through 2080 and 8.2 percent on a permanent
basis. A primary reason is substantial projected increases in entitlement
costs. Figure 4 shows the projected increases in Social Security, Medicare
(this time including not only part A but also part B, supplementary Medicare
insurance, and part D, the new prescription drug beneﬁt), and federal Med-
icaid costs as a share of GDP over the long term.22The projected retirement
of the baby boomers, ongoing increases in life expectancy, and growth in
health care costs per beneficiary in excess of growth in GDP per capita
combine to drive federal expenditure on these three programs from 8.1 per-
110 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
21. Unlike with Social Security, the CBO has not issued its own fully independent actu-
arial analysis of Medicare’s long-term ﬁnances.
22. Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2004). Medicaid is not wholly a federal liability; rather,












Source: Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2004).
Figure 4. Entitlement Expenditure under Current Law, 2003 and Projected 2004–80
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2025, and 22.7 percent by 2075.23 Figure 4 also shows that the vast major-
ity of the growth occurs in the health-related programs, not in Social Secu-
rity. Indeed, after about 2030, Social Security costs are roughly stable
relative to GDP. The health-related programs not only are projected to
increase in cost much more dramatically than Social Security but are also
much more difﬁcult to reform.
To be sure, substantial uncertainty surrounds these short- and long-term
budget projections. Much of the problem stems from the fact that the sur-
plus or deﬁcit is the difference between two large quantities, revenue and
spending. Small percentage errors in either can cause large percentage
changes in the difference between them. Furthermore, small differences in
growth rates sustained for extended periods can have surprisingly large
economic effects. Variations in assumed health care cost inﬂation, in par-
ticular, can have a substantial effect on the projections.24 Nonetheless,
almost all studies that have examined the issue suggest that, even if major
sources of uncertainty are accounted for, serious long-term fiscal imbal-
ances will remain.25
The Economic Effects of Budget Deﬁcits
We categorize the effects of budget deﬁcits into two types. What we here
call the “traditional” effects are those described in terms of changes in the
usual macroeconomic aggregates, such as consumption, saving, and invest-
ment, resulting from the linkages among them as described in macroeco-
nomics textbooks. The Ricardian view, the small open economy view, and
the “conventional” view of deﬁcits all address these kinds of effects. The
“nontraditional” effects include the effects of weakened investor confi-
dence in a country’s economic leadership due to increased deficits, the
possible threshold effect of a sudden change in investor perceptions of
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23. Although it is clear that entitlement spending is a major factor in generating long-
term ﬁscal shortfalls, it is not straightforward to determine how much of the ﬁscal gap is due
to these programs, because to a large extent they are supposed to be funded from general rev-
enue. Auerbach, Gale, and Orszag (2004) examine different ways of decomposing the long-
term ﬁscal gap.
24. CBO, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” December 2003.
25. For example, see Lee and Edwards (2001) and Shoven (2002).
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the strictly economic realm, such as the effect of a country’s debtoror cred-
itor status on its international power and influence.
Traditional Models
Figure 5 summarizes the three “traditional” views of deﬁcits, at least as
they apply to a deﬁcit created by changes in the timing of a lump-sum tax,
holding the path of government purchases constant, as described earlier.
Under Ricardian equivalence, private saving rises in response to the deﬁcit
by the same amount that government saving falls (that is, by the same
amount that the deﬁcit rises); national saving is therefore constant, and no
further adjustments are required or expected.26
If private saving rises by less than the full amount that public saving
falls, then national saving falls, and further adjustments are required to
bring national saving and the sum of domestic and net foreign investment
back into balance.27 If the ﬂow of capital from overseas is inﬁnitely elas-
tic, the entire quantity adjustment occurs through increased capital inﬂows.
In this case net foreign investment declines, but the domestic capital stock
remains constant. With no change in the domestic capital stock, domestic
output (GDP) is likewise constant. Americans’ claims on that output, how-
ever, decline because the increased borrowing from abroad must be repaid
in the future. In other words, the obligation to repay effectively creates a
mortgage against future national income; as a result, future gross national
product declines even though gross domesticproduct is constant.28Because
the capital inﬂow in this example is assumed to be inﬁnitely elastic, inter-
112 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
26. Barro (1974).
27. The effects described in response to a change in the deﬁcit would all occur simulta-
neously. Our ordering of the discussion is intended merely to provide a way of thinking about
the channels through which deﬁcits affect the economy. It does not imply or require that the
effects occur in any particular order over time.
28. The distinction between domestic investment and net foreign investment is of sec-
ondary importance in determining national income (GNP), although it clearly affects domes-
tic income (GDP). Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999, p. 1637) note that, “As long as the returns
to wealth are the same at home and abroad, the location of the . . . [change in] wealth does
not affect our income. . . . Tomorrow’s national output and income depend on today’s
national saving, wherever this saving is ultimately invested.” They also note several caveats
to this statement, including differences in the tax implications of investment abroad relative
to investment at home, and implications for income distribution.
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income (GNP). We refer to this scenario as the small open economy view.
A third possibility is that the supply of international capital is not inﬁ-
nitely elastic. In this case, if national saving falls in response to an increased
budget deﬁcit, the relative price and quantity adjustments are different than
under the small open economy model, but the end result—a decline in future
national income—remains the same. In the absence of perfect capital mobil-
ity, the reduction in national saving implies a shortage of funds to ﬁnance
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 113
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Figure 5. Theoretical Responses to a Change in the Budget Deﬁcit
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puts upward pressure on interest rates, as ﬁrms compete for the limited pool
of funds to ﬁnance investment. The increase in interest rates serves to reduce
domestic investment. In a closed economy, the entire adjustment to the
reduction in national saving would occur through reduced domestic invest-
ment. In an open economy with imperfect capital mobility, the decline in
national saving and the resulting rise in interest rates induce some combi-
nation of a decline in domestic investment and a decline in net foreign
investment (that is, an increase in capital inﬂows). These changes must be
sufﬁcient to ensure that the change in national investment equals the change
in national saving. Following Douglas Elmendorf and Gregory Mankiw, we
refer to this scenario as the conventional view.29
Nontraditional Effects
Beyond their traditional effects on national saving, future national
income, and interest rates, deﬁcits can affect the economy in other ways. For
example, increased deﬁcits may cause investors to gradually lose conﬁdence
in U.S. economic leadership. As Edwin Truman emphasizes,30 a substantial
ﬁscal deterioration over the longer term may cause “a loss of conﬁdence in
the orientation of US economic policies.” Such a loss in conﬁdence could
then put upward pressure on domestic interest rates, as investors demand a
higher risk premium on dollar-denominated assets. The costs of current
account deﬁcits—which are in part induced by large budget deﬁcits—may
even extend beyond the economic costs narrowly deﬁned. Benjamin Fried-
man notes that, “World power and inﬂuence have historically accrued to
creditor countries. It is not coincidental that America emerged as a world
power simultaneously with our transition from a debtor nation . . . to a cred-
itor supplying investment capital to the rest of the world.”31
Both the traditional models and the analysis of nontraditional effects
focus on gradual negative effects from reduced national saving. This
focus may be too limited, however, in that it ignores the possibility of
much more sudden and severe adverse consequences.32 In particular, the
114 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
29. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
30. Truman (2001).
31. Friedman (1988, p. 76).
32. Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004).
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not seriously entertain the possibility of explicit default, or of implicit
default through high inflation.33 If market expectations regarding the
avoidance of default were to change and investors had difficulty seeing
how the policy process could avoid extreme measures, the consequences
could be much more sudden and severe than traditional estimates suggest.
The role of financial market expectations in this type of scenario is 
central. One of the principal ways in which such a “hard landing” could
be triggered is if investors begin to doubt whether a country will main-
tain its strong historical commitment to avoiding high inflation in 
order to reduce the real value of the public debt. As Laurence Ball and
Mankiw note,
We can only guess what level of debt will trigger a shift in investor conﬁ-
dence, and about the nature and severity of the effects. Despite the vague-
ness of fears about hard landings, these fears may be the most important
reason for seeking to reduce budget deficits . . . as countries increase their
debt, they wander into unfamiliar territory in which hard landings may lurk.
If policymakers are prudent, they will not take the chance of learning what
hard landings in G-7 countries are really like.34
Although we do not explicitly incorporate nontraditional effects in our
analysis below, they serve as an important reminder of why budget deﬁcits,
especially chronic deﬁcits, could exert large adverse effects on U.S. eco-
nomic performance. Our focus on traditional effects is certainly justiﬁable
in the context of a historical analysis of postwar data from the United
States. That does not imply, however, that ignoring such issues is appro-
priate when examining the likely impacts of future deﬁcits. The nation has
never before faced the prospect of deficits that are large, sustained, and
indeed likely to grow over many decades.
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33. The traditional view also suggests that either the exchange rate would stay con-
stant or the currency would appreciate in response to the inflow of capital from abroad.
The sign of the exchange rate change, however, is unclear in the presence of changes in a
country-specific risk premium. If that premium increases as a country’s net international
indebtedness (or flow of new international borrowing) increases, the country’s currency
could depreciate. In other words, although nontraditional effects are likely to accentuate
the impact of deficits on interest rates, they may alter even the sign of the exchange rate
dynamics.
34. Ball and Mankiw (1995, p. 117).
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The ﬁrst part of this section sets up the later analysis of deﬁcits, national
saving, and interest rates by providing prima facie evidence of the rela-
tionships among them that are consistent with the conventional view but
hard to reconcile with the small open economy view or the Ricardian view.
The second part then provides some benchmark calculations that give a
sense of the magnitudes involved.
A Preliminary Examination of the Data
Figure 6 shows net national saving and net federal government saving
as shares of net national product (NNP) since 1950.35 Federal saving has
fluctuated significantly over time, and this variation is visibly correlated
116 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
35. Net national saving is deﬁned as gross saving minus depreciation of the capital stock
and is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts, table 5.1, line 2. Net federal
saving is defined as gross federal saving minus depreciation on the federal government’s
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Percent of net national product
Figure 6. Net National Saving and Net Federal Saving, 1950–2003
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last two decades. The two series both rise moderately in the mid-1980s,
decline from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, rise signiﬁcantly during the
1990s, and then decline again over the past few years. Over the whole
period, a regression of national saving on federal saving (each expressed
as a share of NNP) yields a coefficient of 1.02 (t = 7), and an equivalent
first-differences regression (regressing changes in the national saving–NNP
ratio on changes in the federal saving–NNP ratio) yields a coefficient of
0.86 (t = 9).36
Figure 7 shows net national saving and net domestic investment since
1950, again as shares of NNP.37The two series follow very similar patterns
over time. Domestic investment has declined by less than national saving
over the past twenty years and has exceeded national saving in every year
since the early 1980s. The difference is reﬂected in chronic current account
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36. Both regressions include a constant term, as do those mentioned in the next two
paragraphs.
37. Net domestic investment is equal to gross investment minus depreciation of the cap-
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Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
Figure 7. Net Domestic Investment and Net National Saving, 1950–2003
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national investment position.38Over the past few years, the decline in national
saving has been much sharper than the decline in net domestic investment.
Between 1998 and 2003, national saving declined by 6 percent of NNP,
with about half of the decline made up by increased capital inflows, and
half by reduced net domestic investment. A regression of the net domestic
investment–NNP ratio on the net national saving–NNP ratio yields a co-
efﬁcient of 0.57 (t = 15). When the regression is performed on ﬁrst differ-
ences of the two measures, the coefﬁcient is 0.83 (t = 10).39
Figure 8 plots annual observations of the projected ﬁve-year-ahead real
ten-year interest rate on Treasury bonds against the CBO’s projections of
the unified federal deficit as a share of GDP five years ahead.40 Figure 9
shows similar observations for real forward long-term rates and projections
of the publicly held debt. Both figures show a clear association between
projected ﬁscal policy outcomes and forward long-term real interest rates.
A regression of the two series in figure 8 implies that an increase in the
projected deﬁcit by 1 percent of GDP is associated with an increase in the
forward rate of about 27 basis points (t = 5).
Figures 6 through 9 suggest a very simple story: Increases in current fed-
eral budget deﬁcits signiﬁcantly reduce net national saving. This reduction
in national saving is reflected partly in increased borrowing from abroad
and partly in reduced net domestic investment. Increases in projected
future federal deficits raise long-term interest rates, which explains how
reductions in national saving serve to reduce domestic investment. These
patterns are consistent with the conventional view, but not with the Ricar-
dian or the small open economy view. A primary goal of the paper is to see
how robust these simple relationships are to more formal analysis.
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38. The current account, as deﬁned by the “net lending” series published by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis, ran a small surplus in 1991, in part because of capital account trans-
actions related to the Gulf war and in part because of a large statistical discrepancy. On a
current-cost basis, the United States has gone from being the world’s largest creditor nation
in 1980, with a net international investment position (NIIP) of 13 percent of GDP, to the
world’s largest debtor nation, with an NIIP of about −22 percent of GDP at the end of 2003.
On a market-value basis, the NIIP was 7 percent of GDP in 1982, falling to −24 percent at
the end of 2003 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, table
1.1.5, 2004).
39. The positive correlation between domestic saving and domestic investment mirrors
the ﬁndings of a long line of research initiated by Feldstein and Horioka (1980).
40. The data in the ﬁgure are described in more detail later in the paper.
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Source: Laubach (2003).
a. Projected deficits as constructed by Laubach (2003).
Projected five-year-ahead deficit (percent of GDP)
Figure 8. Forward Ten-Year Real Treasury Rates and Projected Deﬁcits, 1976–2004a
The Magnitude of Conventional Effects in Two Simpliﬁed Models
To generate some intuition about the potential magnitudes involved in
the conventional approach, we examine the impact of budget deﬁcits in two
simpliﬁed models. Before turning to these models, however, we must ﬁrst
address a key issue: If ﬁscal policy does inﬂuence interest rates, does it do
so through changes in government deficits (what we call the “flow per-
spective”) or through changes in the government debt (the “stock perspec-
tive”)? According to Eric Engen and Glenn Hubbard,41 government debt
rather than deﬁcits should affect the level of interest rates. However, since
many models (including the IS-LM model widely taught to undergradu-
ates) imply that budget deﬁcits affect interest rates, we take a broader view.
Throughout this paper we leave open the possibility that either the stock
perspective or the ﬂow perspective may be valid. In this section we there-
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 119fore undertake two related calibration exercises. One focuses on the impact
of the deﬁcit in a Solow model of economic growth, and the other on the
impact of debt in a highly stylized steady-state exercise.
First, we follow Matthew Shapiro and examine the effects of sustained
budget deficits in the context of the Solow growth model.42 Following
Mankiw,43 we assume that the economy’s growth rate (the sum of the rate
of population growth and that of output per worker) is equal to 3 percent
a year, the depreciation rate is 4 percent a year, and the capital share of
output is 30 percent. We also assume that the initial gross national saving
rate is 17.5 percent of output.44 This level for the saving rate could, for
example, reflect a private gross saving rate of 20 percent of output and a
unified budget deficit of 2.5 percent, which are the values we assume for
120 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
42. Shapiro (2004).
43. Mankiw (2000a, p. 123).
44. Mankiw assumes a capital-output ratio of 2.5 and then solves for the saving rate. The
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Source: Laubach (2003).
a. Projected debt as constructed by Laubach (2003).
Figure 9. Forward Ten-Year Real Treasury Rates and Projected Debt, 1976–2004a
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 120illustrative purposes. These assumptions generate an initial steady state
with a capital-output ratio of 2.5 and a gross marginal product of capital
of 12 percent, which are reasonable values for the United States (table 1).
Now assume that the uniﬁed budget deﬁcit rises by 1 percent of output
on a sustained basis.45 Suppose that one-quarter of this decline in public
saving is offset by an increase in private saving.46 With this response, pri-
vate saving rises to 20.25 percent of output, and the national saving rate
declines to 16.75 percent. Given the reduction in national saving, output
per capita in the new steady state is reduced by 1.9 percent. The marginal
product of capital is 54 basis points higher. If we assume that the change
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 121
45. Note that this simpliﬁed model does not impose a government budget constraint. As
a result, we do not have to specify how the tax cut is paid for.
46. This private saving response is somewhat larger than might be expected based on the
data patterns in figure 6, but it is within the range of the econometric estimates we report
below. It is also roughly consistent with the calculations undertaken by the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (Economic Report of the President,2003) in the Bush administration, which
reports that a one-dollar increase in the deﬁcit reduces the domestic capital stock by about
60 cents. The Council’s scenario could occur, for example, if a one-dollar increase in the
deﬁcit causes private saving to rise by 25 cents (the effect we assume) and international cap-
ital ﬂows offset an additional 15 cents of the decline in national saving. Dennis and others
(2004) make similar assumptions about private saving and capital ﬂow offsets in modeling
the macroeconomy. See Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Dornbusch (1991) for analyses
of the relationship between capital inﬂows and national saving.
Table 1. Steady-State Effects of an Increased Budget Deﬁcit in the Solow Growth Model
Percent except where stated otherwise
Assumed
initial Offset = 25 Offset = 0 Offset = 50
Parameter value percent percent percent
Capital share of output 30.0 30.0 30.0 30.0
Annual depreciation rate 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Annual GDP growth rate 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
National saving as share of GDP 17.5 16.75 16.5 17.0
Private saving as share of GDP 20.0 20.25 20.0 20.5
Budget deﬁcit as share of GDP 2.5 3.5 3.5 3.5
Income per capita 1.48 1.45 1.44 1.46
Capital-output ratio 2.5 2.39 2.36 2.43
Marginal product of capital 12.0 12.5 12.7 12.4
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Value in new steady state following
increase in deﬁcit of 1 percent of output,
offset by private saving as indicated
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the marginal product of capital, the implication is that the increase in the
uniﬁed budget deﬁcit raises the interest rate by 54 basis points.
These results provide one way of calibrating the traditional effects of
changes in the budget deficit. Under our base case assumptions, holding
other factors constant, a sustained increase in the uniﬁed deﬁcit of 1 percent
of GDP reduces output by about 2 percent and raises interest rates by
about 50 basis points. If half of the decline in public saving, rather than one-
quarter, is offset by an increase in private saving, long-term output per
capita would decline by 1.2 percent and interest rates would rise by 35 basis
points. If there is no private saving response, output per capita would fall
by 2.5 percent, and the marginal product of capital would rise by 73 basis
points. (Table 1 summarizes these results.)
The Solow model exercise underscores the somewhat arbitrary nature
of choosing between the stock and ﬂow perspectives described above: In
the steady state of the Solow model, deﬁcits and debt are linked, making it
difﬁcult to assert that one variable rather than the other is the one that inﬂu-
ences interest rates. Nonetheless, since our Solow analysis was presented
in terms of the flow variable (the deficit), we also undertake a closely
related exercise framed in terms of the stock variable (government debt).
In steady state the debt-GDP ratio is equal to the uniﬁed deﬁcit–GDP ratio
divided by the GDP growth rate.47 Assuming a 3 percent growth rate as in
the Solow model exercise above, an increase in the unified deficit-GDP
ratio of 1 percent of GDP would thus raise the steady-state debt–GDP ratio
by approximately 33 percentage points.
To map this increase in the debt-GDP ratio into a change in income
and interest rates, we follow the basic contours of the “debt fairy” calcu-
lation in Ball and Mankiw.48 First, as in the Solow model above, we
assume that the initial steady state for the economy involves a capital-
output ratio of 2.5. The change in the ratio depends on how much of the
debt increase is offset by increased private capital accumulation; we
assume a 25 percent offset. (Because of depreciation, the 25 percent cap-
ital offset is a slightly different concept from the 25 percent saving off-
122 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
47. If the uniﬁed deﬁcit is a constant share k of GDP, then (rD + p)/Y = k, where r is the
interest rate, D is government debt, p is the primary budget balance, and Y is GDP. A con-
stant debt-GDP ratio requires that D grow at rate g, or that (rD + p)/D = g, where g is the
growth rate of Y. Therefore, in a steady state with a constant debt-GDP ratio, D/Y = k/g.
48. Ball and Mankiw (1995).
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slightly from the Solow model results.) The reduction in capital is thus
equal to 25 percent (= 33 × 0.75) of initial GDP. Assuming a marginal
product of capital equal to 12 percent, the reduction in the capital stock
causes income to decline by about 3 percent. Second, to map the change
in the capital-output ratio into a change in the marginal product of capi-
tal, a specific form of the aggregate production function is necessary.
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the percentage increase in the
marginal product of capital is equal to the percentage decline in the capital-
output ratio. The capital-output ratio falls by 7 percent, from 2.50 to 2.32.
The marginal product of capital would thus rise by 7 percent, from 12.0
to 12.8. Finally, we again assume that the change in the long-term gov-
ernment borrowing rate is equal to the change in the marginal product of
capital. The result is that income declines by 3 percent, and steady-state
long-term interest rates increase by about 80 basis points.
Since these two exercises are quite closely related despite their different
framing in terms of deﬁcits and debt, it is not surprising that the results are
basically similar. A sustained increase in the uniﬁed deﬁcit equal to 1 per-
cent of GDP reduces income by 2 to 3 percent and raises long-term interest
rates by roughly 50 to 80 basis points under the base case assumptions.49
To be sure, it is challenging to move from these simplified models to
real-world results. For one thing, the models assume a closed economy,
whereas the U.S. economy is large and open. One would therefore expect
capital inﬂows to mitigate the interest rate and domestic production effects
to some degree, even though the effect on national income should be largely
unaffected by the assumption of a closed economy. In our view, however,
these exercises not only help to calibrate the potential magnitude of the
effects of deficits and debt on income and interest rates, but also under-
score the shortcomings in ruling out the stock (debt) or the flow (deficit)
perspective a priori.
Another key consideration is that the results above consider only the
effects of increased budget deficits or debt per se. A full analysis of the
effects of public policies on economic growth should take into account not
only the effects of increased deﬁcits and debt, but also the direct effects of
the increases in spending programs or reductions in taxes that cause them.
The effects of fiscal policies on both economic performance and interest
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49. As noted in the text, the small differences reﬂect the treatment of depreciation.
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the policies generating that deﬁcit. For example, a dollar spent on public
investment projects would increase the uniﬁed budget deﬁcit by one dol-
lar, but the net effect on future income would depend on whether the return
on those investment projects exceeded the return on the private capital that
would have instead been ﬁnanced by the national saving crowded out by
the deﬁcit. Similarly, a deﬁcit of 1 percent of GDP caused by reducing mar-
ginal tax rates will generally have different implications for both national
income and interest rates than a deficit of 1 percent of GDP caused by
increasing government purchases of goods and services. We return to this
issue in the concluding section.
Deﬁcits and Consumption
Our goal in this section is to measure the effects of fiscal policy on
consumption and thus to distinguish the Ricardian view from the other
two views. A wide variety of research tends to reject various indirect
implications of Ricardian equivalence. For example, previous studies
have generally found that motives for bequests are neither universal nor
purely altruistic, that consumer spending responds to temporary tax cuts,
that only current and not anticipated changes in income affect consump-
tion (although there is mixed evidence on this point), and that aggregate
consumption is sensitive to the age distribution of the population.50
We focus on a different set of tests: those using aggregate time-series
data to examine the impact of tax revenue on consumption, holding other
factors constant. Despite the numerous rejections of Ricardian equiva-
lence in the indirect tests noted above, the time has come to revisit the
aggregate time-series effects of fiscal policy on consumption, for several
reasons. First, these analyses provide a direct test of whether the timing
of tax collections affects the economy, controlling for other factors. Sec-
ond, the aggregate time-series tests measure the magnitude of the effects
in question. This is particularly important because virtually no one claims
that Ricardian equivalence is literally true. Rather, the controversy is
over the extent to which Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation
124 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
50. See, for example, the discussions in Bernheim (1987), Elmendorf and Mankiw
(1999), and Seater (1993).
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can be helpful in distinguishing whether the literal implications of Ricar-
dian equivalence hold, but they are often uninformative about the quanti-
tative importance of any particular rejection of the theory. Third, there has
been little work on these issues using data beyond the early 1990s. The
past ten years, however, have witnessed dramatic shifts in fiscal policy in
both directions (figures 1 and 6). These shifts have raised the prominence
of policy concerns about budget deficits and should provide useful vari-
ation from an econometric perspective. Fourth, despite the rejection of
many of the indirect implications of Ricardian equivalence noted above,
some lines of research using aggregate time-series data have proved more
favorable to the Ricardian view. This may be due to problems that are
unique to time-series analysis, but it may also be that Ricardian equiva-
lence is more robust—in particular as a working approximation—than
the indirect tests suggest.
Previous Research
The authors of earlier literature surveys have noted the wide variety of
research ﬁndings from studies of aggregate consumption and ﬁscal policy
and emphasize the daunting econometric problems inherent in such studies,
but they come to different conclusions about what the literature shows.
Robert Barro, and Elmendorf and Mankiw, conclude that the literature is
inconclusive.51 John Seater concludes that, once the studies are corrected
for econometric problems, Ricardian equivalence is corroborated, or at
least cannot be rejected.52 Douglas Bernheim concludes that, once the
studies are normalized appropriately, Ricardian equivalence should be
rejected.53
Previous studies of the effects of fiscal policy on consumption have
taken three general approaches. A variety of studies undertake reduced-
form analysis of consumption and saving patterns in the United States and
other countries.54Like ﬁgures 6 and 7 above, these studies generally appear
to support non-Ricardian interpretations of the data.
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51. Barro (1989); Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
52. Seater (1993).
53. Bernheim (1989).
54. See, for example, Summers (1985), Carroll and Summers (1987), Poterba and Sum-
mers (1986, 1987), and Serres and Pelgrin (2003).
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sumption functions and then tests for the effects of ﬁscal policy given the
consumption function.55Perhaps the best-known research in this area is that
by Roger Kormendi and Philip Meguire, who find no evidence of non-
Ricardian effects.56
A third strand of the literature focuses on Euler equation tests. David
Aschauer examines the effects of ﬁscal policy assuming utility maximiza-
tion and rational expectations, but his model does not nest a non-Ricardian
speciﬁcation.57 Fred Graham and Daniel Himarios nest Ricardian and non-
Ricardian views in a model that builds on work by Fumio Hayashi; they
find non-Ricardian results using a nonlinear instrumental variables esti-
mation procedure.58 Paul Evans and Iftekhar Hasan estimate an empirical
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55. Feldstein (1982); Seater and Mariano (1985); Kormendi (1983).
56. Kormendi (1983); Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990, 1995). A comprehensive review
of the literature following Kormendi (1983) is beyond the scope of this paper, but some high-
lights include the following. Barth, Iden, and Russek (1986) update the data, correct some data
problems, and obtain results broadly similar to those of Kormendi (1983). Modigliani and
Sterling (1986) argue that Kormendi’s results are ﬂawed because of data problems, a failure
to distinguish between temporary and permanent taxes, and inappropriate ﬁrst-differencing
of the data. They develop an aggregate consumption function derived from the life-cycle
model that contains Ricardian equivalence as a special case. Their empirical results show
strongly non-Ricardian results. Kormendi and Meguire (1986) note significant problems
with how Modigliani and Sterling have deﬁned temporary taxes. They show that imposing
the condition that taxes and transfers have effects of equal magnitude and opposite sign (as
Modigliani and Sterling do) is not supported by the data, and that when that restriction is
relaxed, taxes and government debt continue to have Ricardian effects. Feldstein and Elmen-
dorf (1990) work within the Kormendi framework and evaluate the effects of removing the
war years, extending the sample, introducing other speciﬁcation changes, and instrumenting
for endogenous explanatory variables. After reproducing Kormendi’s estimates, they find
that their extensions fundamentally alter the findings, and they obtain very strong non-
Ricardian results. Kormendi and Meguire (1990), however, show that Feldstein and
Elmendorf’s results obtain only as the joint consequence of using what Kormendi and
Meguire view as the wrong deflators and failing to incorporate the improved definitions
of variables that came out of the 1986 exchanges. Graham (1995) makes two adjustments
to the Kormendi and Meguire framework, extended to 1991. He allows state and local vari-
ables to have different effects than federal variables. He also claims that theory suggests
that labor and capital income should have distinct effects, and he proposes a decomposi-
tion of aggregate income and taxes into those due to labor and those due to capital. His
reestimates suggest some non-Ricardian results, but not for tax revenue. Kormendi and
Meguire (1995) challenge the decomposition of income into labor and capital and show
that an alternative definition generates Ricardian results. Meguire (1998, 2003) continues
research in this vein.
57. Aschauer (1985); see also Bernheim (1987) and Graham and Himarios (1991).
58. Graham and Himarios (1991); Hayashi (1982).
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non-Ricardian alternatives, and obtain results consistent with Ricardian
equivalence.59 Graham and Himarios correct several data and econometric
problems in Evans’ work and ﬁnd strong non-Ricardian effects.60
The relative value of the consumption function and Euler equation
approaches is a recurring theme in the literature. The advantage of using the
Euler equation approach is that Ricardian equivalence requires a combina-
tion of utility maximization and rational expectations that the Euler equa-
tion can explicitly incorporate. The disadvantage is that Euler equation
models can (and do) fail for reasons unrelated to Ricardian equivalence, and
Ricardian equivalence can fail in ways that do not affect the Euler equa-
tion.61 Marjorie Flavin argues that the consumption function approach is
fundamentally inconsistent with Ricardian equivalence and therefore can-
not be used to test the theory.62 On the other hand, the strongest evidence in
favor of Ricardian equivalence comes from the consumption function stud-
ies by Kormendi and Meguire.63 Rather than attempt to resolve this debate,
we estimate both consumption function and Euler equation models. We also
show that the two speciﬁcations are closely related, so that the differences
between the resulting estimated equations may not be large, even though the
conceptual frameworks are quite different.
Specifying the Consumption Function
Our speciﬁcation of the consumption function replicates, updates, and
extends the work by Kormendi and Meguire and their critics. Kormendi
speciﬁes an aggregate consumption function of the following form:64
(1) Ct =α 0 +α 11Yt +α 12Yt−1 +α 2GSt +α 3Wt−1 +α 4TRt
+ α5TXt +α 6REt +α 7GINTt +α 8GBt−1 +ε t,
where t indexes time periods; C is a measure of consumption; Y is net
national product; GS is government purchases of goods and services; W is
a measure of private net worth, not including government debt; TR is gov-
ernment transfer payments; TX is tax revenue; RE is corporate retained
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59. Evans (1988, 1993); Evans and Hasan (1994); Blanchard (1985).
60. Graham and Himarios (1996).
61. Bernheim (1987),
62. Flavin (1987).
63. Kormendi (1983); Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990).
64. Kormendi (1983).
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outstanding government debt.65
RICARDIAN AND NON-RICARDIAN HYPOTHESES. Although equation 1 is not
speciﬁed in a structural manner, Kormendi argues that this framework nests
both Ricardian and non-Ricardian hypotheses.66The Ricardian view is that
consumption depends on current wealth, expected future income, and the
burdens imposed by government purchases. If current and lagged NNP
serve as proxies for future income, then the expected coefﬁcients on NNP
and lagged NNP should be between zero and one. Likewise, in this formu-
lation, the coefﬁcient on wealth represents the marginal propensity to con-
sume out of wealth. Current government purchases are included as a proxy
for expected future government purchases. The non-Ricardian view embod-
ied in the equation is that consumption depends on disposable income,
wealth, and government bonds. Note that disposable income is given by
Y + TR − TX − RE + GINT.
The central tests between the Ricardian and the non-Ricardian view
have to do with the coefficients on current taxes and current transfers.
Ricardian equivalence implies that α4 =α 5 = 0, that is, that transfers and
taxes should not affect consumption, given the path of government pur-
chases. The values of these coefficients, if they are not zero, provide a
quantitative measure of the extent to which Ricardian equivalence fails as
a description of reality. The coefﬁcients on the two variables may be dif-
ferent from each other if transfers and taxes generally accrue to groups with
different consumption patterns.
Ricardian equivalence also implies that α8 = 0, that is, that consumers
do not treat government bonds as net wealth. Although this channel for
non-Ricardian effects has attracted an enormous amount of attention over
the past several decades, it is unlikely to prove useful in distinguishing
Ricardian and non-Ricardian views, for several reasons. First, it is unlikely
to be the major channel through which non-Ricardian effects occur. James
Poterba and Lawrence Summers, as well as Evans, show that, if Ricardian
equivalence is violated solely because forward-looking, life-cycle con-
sumers treat government bonds completely as net worth, the effects of ﬁs-
128 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
65. National saving equals NNP less government purchases and private consumption.
Therefore, because the regression controls for NNP and government purchases, the effect
of tax revenue on national saving is simply the inverse of the effect of tax revenue on 
consumption.
66. Kormendi (1983).
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discussed further below, there are both data and conceptual problems with
interpreting the government bond and wealth variables. As a result, we do
not emphasize this channel for testing between the different models.68
Unfortunately, the coefﬁcient on government spending does not provide
a test of Ricardian equivalence. Ricardian equivalence is a statement about
how variations in the timing of taxation affect private consumption, hold-
ing expected government purchases constant. It has no necessary implica-
tions for the effects of government purchases on private consumption,
since the items the government purchases could be substitutes or comple-
ments for private consumption.69 Thus, although it is important to control
for expected government purchases, the coefﬁcient on the purchases vari-
able does not provide information that can test the theory.70
DATA. All of the variables are ﬁrst transformed into real per capita lev-
els.71 To deal with stationarity issues, Kormendi and Meguire, and Martin
Feldstein and Elmendorf, estimate regressions in first differences of the
levels of the variables and in first differences of their ratios to NNP per
capita.72 Following John Campbell and Mankiw,73 we also adjust for sta-
tionarity a third way, by dividing the ﬁrst differences in the levels by lagged
NNP per capita.74
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 129
67. Poterba and Summers (1987); Evans (1991).
68. The coefﬁcients on government interest payments and retained earnings should be
zero under Ricardian equivalence, but this test is not particularly interesting, because these
coefﬁcients should also be zero under other hypotheses. For example, the view that house-
holds pierce the corporate veil suggests that retained earnings should not affect consump-
tion. Likewise, if government interest payments accrue mainly to high-income households
who tend to save the funds, they will not affect consumption.
69. Kormendi (1983) obtains a negative coefﬁcient on government purchases and inter-
prets this finding as evidence in favor of Ricardian equivalence. Kormendi and Meguire
(1990), however, acknowledge that the coefficient on government spending is essentially
uninformative in testing Ricardian and non-Ricardian views.
70. There is an inconsistency in the specification in that current levels of government
purchases are intended to proxy for permanent levels, but current levels of taxes and trans-
fers are intended to represent levels that may well be altered in the future.
71. Details of the data construction may be found at www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/
journals/bpea-macro/2004_2_bpea.consumptiondata.pdf or obtained from the authors on request.
72. Kormendi and Meguire (1990); Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990).
73. Campbell and Mankiw (1990).
74. Campbell and Mankiw (1990) divide by lagged disposable income rather than NNP,
but the difference is unimportant empirically in our specifications. We divide by NNP in
order to maintain consistency with the ﬁrst-difference-in-ratios speciﬁcation.
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by Kormendi: expenditure on nondurables and services, plus 10 percent
of current durable expenditures, plus 30 percent of the existing stock of
durable goods, all per capita.75 The second measure is nondurables plus
services, a more common measure used in many studies of aggregate 
consumption.76
The wealth variable used by Kormendi and Meguire and others in this
literature is an amalgam of different series, with several extrapolations. We
instead use data on household wealth from the Federal Reserve Board’s
Flow of Funds reports. We use household rather than private sector net
worth, because the household measure includes the market value of cor-
porate equities held by households, whereas the private sector measure
instead uses book values of corporate equity. Since we want to capture the
influence of wealth on consumption, we believe that the market value of
equities is the more appropriate measure to include. Note, however, that
the data for private sector bonds are reported on a book-value basis in the
Flow of Funds accounts.
For data on the market value of federal government bonds, we use infor-
mation from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. For state debt we use the
same methodology as Seater,77but we include more recent data. Generally,
the data under the new deﬁnitions track the data under the old deﬁnitions
very closely for the years in which values of both are present.78
With these adjustments, we have nearly the same specification em-
ployed by Kormendi and Meguire.79 In earlier work we almost exactly
replicate their results for earlier time periods dating from as far back as
1931 up to 1992.80
EXTENDING THE KORMENDI-MEGUIRE APPROACH. Our analysis here fo-
cuses on three extensions of this framework. First, we extend the sample
130 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
75. Kormendi (1983).
76. Graham (1992) and Graham and Himarios (1996) discuss the importance of alter-
native consumption measures in testing Ricardian equivalence.
77. Seater (1981).
78. The data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas appear to have been derived using
the same procedures as those developed in Cox (1985). The market value of state debt is cal-
culated by multiplying the outstanding par value of state and local bonds (taken from the Sta-
tistical Abstract of the United States) by the ratio of market to par value for municipal bonds
(taken from Standard and Poor’s, 2003).
79. Kormendi (1983); Kormendi and Meguire (1986, 1990, 1995).
80. Gale and Orszag (2003c).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 130period to 2002. The added ten years of data provide valuable variation in
ﬁscal policy and national saving.
Second, we alter the treatment of government taxes and transfers. In the
Kormendi-Meguire specification, all government variables (taxes, trans-
fers, purchases, interest payments, and debt) represent combined values for
federal, state, and local governments. But federal and state ﬁscal variables
are likely to have different effects on aggregate consumption. Perhaps most
important, the states collect a significant share of their revenue through
consumption taxes; this revenue would be expected to vary positively with
consumption, whereas revenue from other taxes would be expected, at least
in non-Ricardian theory, to vary negatively. In addition, the states face bal-
anced budget rules. The cyclical dynamics of changes in state taxes or
spending may therefore be different than for federal taxes or spending,
which implies that the behavioral response to such changes might be dif-
ferent. The balanced budget rules also imply that state debt may be paid off
at a different rate than federal debt, which again could inﬂuence behavior.
Likewise, to the extent that state and local taxes are capitalized into local
real estate prices, they are likely to have different effects than federal
taxes.81For all of these reasons, testing for differences in the effects of fed-
eral and state taxes is a reasonable speciﬁcation check.
Third, in some speciﬁcations we include as control variables estimates
of marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income. Not controlling
for marginal tax rates may bias the coefﬁcient on tax revenue. Changes in
tax revenue that also entail changes in tax rates create both substitution and
income effects for current consumers. Even in a Ricardian world, changes
in marginal tax rates will induce shifts in consumption and labor supply
behavior. Therefore, in order to isolate the effects of changes in tax rev-
enue, a control for tax rates is required. Several authors emphasize the
potential importance of the confounding effects of not controlling for 
marginal tax rates;82 its importance is buttressed by the work of Kenneth
Judd and of Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff, who show that the
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81. Another issue is that state and federal governments typically allocate their purchases
of goods and services differently: a large share of federal purchases goes to defense, whereas
state purchases are dedicated more to education, police, and health care. Finally, mobility
across states is much higher than emigration out of the United States; the basic Ricardian
story does not hold when individuals (and their offspring) can escape the future burden of
taxation by moving.
82. Barro (1989); Bernheim (1989); Plosser (1987b).
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to marginal tax incentives.83 Despite all of these considerations, however,
almost all previous studies of Ricardian equivalence omit marginal tax
rates from their regressions; an exception is the study by Seater and
Roberto Mariano, and even they omit corporate tax rates.84
For the marginal tax rate on labor income we use a measure constructed
by the Treasury Department, which represents the combined marginal tax
rate due to income and payroll taxes on a four-person family with twice the
median income, all of which comes from wages. (We use twice median
income, rather than median income, to capture the fact that significantly
more than half of all earnings accrue to those who earn more than the
median.) Our capital income tax rate is the average, economy-wide, mar-
ginal effective tax rate on new capital investment.85 An advantage of these
series is that most of the variation in them stems from legislative changes
in tax rules rather than from changes in macroeconomic aggregates.
Consumption Function Results
Table 2 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) results for the speciﬁcation
described above. We estimate regressions for three time periods, two mea-
sures of consumption, three transformations of the dependent and inde-
pendent variables, and three speciﬁcations of the explanatory variables.
The ﬁrst panel of table 2 reports results from regressions that follow the
Kormendi and Meguire specification of explanatory variables.86 The first
three columns report estimates of equations in which the variables are
entered as ﬁrst differences of their levels; the second column of this group
shows that, when the sample is restricted to 1954–92, consumption does
not respond to changes in taxes in a statistically signiﬁcant fashion. This
ﬁnding replicates and conﬁrms the basic Kormendi and Meguire estimates.
The ﬁrst column, however, shows that merely updating the data through
2002 alters the conclusion, even with no further changes in speciﬁcation. In
this regression the coefﬁcient on the tax variable implies that, controlling
for other factors, between 27 and 39 percent of a tax cut is spent in the year
it occurs; the Ricardian benchmark would be zero, and the pure Keynesian
132 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
83. Judd (1985, 1987a, 1987b); Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). In contrast, Seater
(1993) suggests that any bias arising from the omission of marginal tax rates is not important.
84. Seater and Mariano (1985).
85. These data are from Gravelle (2004).
86. Kormendi and Meguire (1990).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 132Table 2. Consumption Function OLS Estimates of the Effects of Taxes on Aggregate Consumptiona
Variables entered as ﬁrst Variables entered as ﬁrst differences Variables entered as ﬁrst differences 
differences of levels of ratios to NNP per capita of levels, scaled to NNP per capita
Dependent variable 1956–2002 1954–92 1954–2000 1956–2002 1954–92 1954–2000 1956–2002 1954–92 1954–2000
Regressions using Kormendi-Meguire speciﬁcation of independent variables
Kormendi measure of  −0.39 −0.14 −0.23 −0.22 −0.09 −0.19 −0.24 −0.14 −0.23
consumptionb (−0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
Expenditure on nondurables −0.27 −0.15 −0.23 −0.18 −0.10 −0.18 −0.21 −0.15 −0.22
and servicesc (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13)
As above but entering federal taxes and state and local taxes separatelyd
Kormendi measure  −0.46 −0.21 −0.30 −0.28 −0.17 −0.26 −0.31 −0.25 −0.31
of consumption (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Expenditure on nondurables −0.34 −0.23 −0.29 −0.25 −0.20 −0.26 −0.27 −0.27 −0.31
and services (0.11) (0.16) (0.14) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
As above but also including marginal tax ratesd
Kormendi measure of  −0.46 −0.15 −0.26 −0.34 −0.22 −0.30 −0.34 −0.24 −0.33
consumption (0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Expenditure on nondurables −0.34 −0.18 −0.27 −0.30 −0.25 −0.30 −0.30 −0.26 −0.32
and services (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.13)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Gravelle (2004); Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve; U.S. Census Bureau; and
Standard and Poor’s.
a. Table reports regression coefﬁcients on the tax revenue variable in equation 1 in the text. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
b. Real consumption per capita of nondurables and services, plus 10 percent of expenditure on durable goods, plus 30 percent of the stock of durable goods (Kormendi, 1983).
c. Real expenditure per capita on nondurables and services multiplied by the sample-period mean ratio of total consumption expenditure to nondurable and services expenditure.















































3benchmark would be close to 100 percent. These conclusions are not par-
ticularly sensitive to the starting point for the data (results not shown), but
they are sensitive to the ending date: the third column shows that the sta-
tistical significance of the tax coefficient depends on whether 2001 and
2002 are included. This sensitivity to the last two years of the data is not
present when the speciﬁcation is improved, as shown below. The remain-
ing columns in the ﬁrst panel report results of different transformations of
the dependent variable and show similar although smaller effects.
The middle panel splits the federal and state tax variables, for the rea-
sons noted above. This has several effects on the results. First, the absolute
values of the coefﬁcients and the associated t statistics on federal taxes are
larger than were the corresponding values for all taxes in the ﬁrst panel. For
the period 1954 through 2002, the estimates suggest that between 25 and
46 cents of every dollar in federal tax cuts is consumed in the first year,
controlling for other factors. Second, the statistical significance of the
results is no longer sensitive to whether the last two years are included.
Third, although the results are not shown, the coefﬁcients on the state tax
variables are positive, large, and precisely estimated. This buttresses the
view that federal and state taxes can have different effects on the economy,
and it points out an important source of aggregation bias (between federal
and state tax revenue) in previous work on this subject.87
The regressions reported in the bottom panel of table 2 again split the
tax variables into their federal and state components but also include the
variables for marginal tax rates on labor income and capital income. Their
inclusion has only a small effect on the estimated coefﬁcients.
Table 3 reports the coefﬁcient estimates for the six regressions in the bot-
tom panel of table 2 that cover the full sample period (1956–2002). Several
results are worth highlighting. The coefﬁcients on NNP and lagged NNP are
similar to those reported by Kormendi and Meguire.88 Government pur-
chases enter with a small, positive, statistically insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient.89
The contrast between the effects of federal and state taxes is stark. State
taxes enter with a positive coefﬁcient that hovers around 1.0, whereas the
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87. The results are similar when all the ﬁscal variables, not just taxes, are split into fed-
eral and state components (not shown).
88. Kormendi and Meguire (1990).
89. In Gale and Orszag (2003c) we show that, in earlier periods, the coefficient on the
purchases variable is larger and precisely estimated, consistent with other results in the
literature.
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 134Table 3. OLS Coefﬁcient Estimates for All Independent Variables in the Consumption Functiona
Variables measured as ﬁrst Variables measured as ﬁrst
Variables measured as ﬁrst differences of ratios to NNP differences of levels, scaled
differences of levels per capita to NNP per capita
Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables
consumption and services consumption and services consumption and services
Independent variable measure expenditure measure expenditure measure expenditure
Current-period NNP 0.36 0.33 3.41 3.05 0.27 0.31
(0.08) (0.07) (0.96) (0.92) (0.06) (0.06)
Lagged NNP 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Government purchases 0.15 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.06
(0.15) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Federal taxes −0.46 −0.34 −0.34 −0.30 −0.34 −0.30
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
State and local taxes 0.88 0.99 0.85 1.00 0.92 0.98
(0.49) (0.41) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37) (0.35)
Government transfers 0.76 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.26 0.25
(0.29) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) (0.26) (0.24)
Government interest paid 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.24 −0.06 0.09
















































5Table 3. OLS Coefﬁcient Estimates for All Independent Variables in the Consumption Functiona (continued)
Variables measured as ﬁrst Variables measured as ﬁrst
Variables measured as ﬁrst differences of ratios to NNP differences of levels, scaled
differences of levels per capita to NNP per capita
Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables
consumption and services consumption and services consumption and services
Independent variable measure expenditure measure expenditure measure expenditure
Lagged government debt −0.03 −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged wealth 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Corporate retained earnings 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.00
(0.16) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00)
Marginal tax rate on capitalb 1.03 1.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07
(0.65) (0.55) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Marginal tax rate on laborb −1.39 −1.45 −0.06 −0.06 −0.06 −0.07
(0.71) (0.59) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Gravelle (2004); Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve; U.S. Census
Bureau; and Standard and Poor’s.
a. Table reports regression coefficients for all independent variables in the regressions using 1956–2002 data in the bottom panel of table 2. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Number of observations N = 47. All lags are one-period lags. Consumption measures are as deﬁned in table 2.















































6coefficient on federal taxes is always negative; both coefficients are sig-
nificantly different from zero. Government transfers raise consumption,
and the effect is statistically different from zero in most of the specifica-
tions.90 The marginal tax rate on capital enters with a positive coefficient,
whereas the marginal tax rate on labor enters with a negative coefﬁcient.
Both effects are plausible and are economically small. Private wealth enters
with a small, positive, but imprecisely estimated effect, and government
bonds with a small, negative, but imprecisely estimated effect.91
In summary, these results demonstrate that, within the framework that
supporters of Ricardian equivalence have viewed as providing the most
credible evidence in their favor, updated data and an improved speciﬁca-
tion reveal robust non-Ricardian effects: in these speciﬁcations about 30 to
46 cents of every dollar in federal tax cuts is spent in the same year.
Nevertheless, there are significant concerns with this set of specifica-
tions. Most notably, the equations are not derived explicitly from a well-
defined economic model, and many of the key explanatory variables are
likely to be endogenous. Although one can use instrumental variables tech-
niques to address concerns about endogeneity, such an effort raises special
problems in the consumption function approach,92 and the specification
contains a very large number of potentially endogenous variables. For
these reasons we turn to Euler equations, which we estimate in both OLS
and instrumental variables forms.
Specifying the Euler Equation
This section develops an Euler equation speciﬁcation that nests Ricar-
dian and non-Ricardian alternatives. In the standard speciﬁcation, under the
permanent-income hypothesis, consumers adjust their consumption in each
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90. In the regressions that exclude the marginal tax rates, the transfers coefficient is
always large, positive, and statistically signiﬁcant.
91. We examined several alternative speciﬁcations, none of which affected the results
in any important way. First, to account for the fact that Ricardian consumers should care
about expected future government purchases, not just current purchases, we performed
regressions using data on future government purchases, or with CBO projections of five-
year-ahead government spending, instead of current values. Second, we adjusted the gov-
ernment bond variable to include only domestically held bonds. Third, we explored
alternative deﬁnitions of taxes and transfers, by changing the classiﬁcation of nontax pay-
ments from a revenue item to a negative transfer payment and changing the classiﬁcation of
federal transfers to states from a government purchase to a transfer.
92. See Flavin (1987).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 137period so that the marginal utility of consumption follows a random walk.93
With a few simplifying assumptions, consumption itself follows a random
walk (with drift), which implies that the change in consumption is given by
(2) ∆Ct =α+ε t,
where εt is a forecast error that is uncorrelated with all information in peri-
ods t−1 and before but may be correlated with current-period information.
Our goal is to expand on the model in equation 2 to account explicitly
for Ricardian consumers and for consumers who exhibit any of a variety of
types of non-Ricardian behavior. Campbell and Mankiw specify a model
in which a share λ of all disposable income YD goes to rule-of-thumb
consumers who immediately consume the resources.94 The remainder 
of income accrues to “farsighted” consumers, who behave according to
equation 2. This generates a consumption equation of the form
(3) ∆Ct =α+λ ∆ YDt + (1 −λ )εt.
Blanchard develops a model of farsighted, life-cycle consumers that also
contains Ricardian equivalence as a special case (where consumers have an
inﬁnite horizon).95Based on Blanchard, Evans, and Graham and Himarios,96
the model implies that aggregate consumption can be written as
(4) ∆Ct =α+β 1∆Wt−1 +β 2∆Bt−1 + v1t,
where W is private net worth and B is the real outstanding stock of gov-
ernment bonds. As Evans shows,97 life-cycle consumers will generate
negative values for β1 and β2. In the limiting case of Ricardian equiva-
lence, β1 and β2 are zero, and the equation collapses to equation 2. Thus,
if proportions µ1 and µ2 of private wealth and government bonds, respec-
tively, are held by life-cycle consumers, and the remaining shares by
Ricardian consumers, equations 3 and 4 can be combined to allow for
both groups of consumers:
(5) ∆Ct =α+λ ∆ YDt +γ 1∆Wt−1 +γ 2∆Bt−1 + v2t,
where γi =β iµi.
138 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
93. Hall (1978).
94. Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990).
95. Blanchard (1985).
96. Blanchard (1985); Evans (1988); Graham and Himarios (1996).
97. Evans (1988).
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disposable income or past changes in wealth, but they may be affected by
changes in expectations regarding future government purchases (although,
as noted above, the sign of the effect is not clear). Moreover, for all groups,
with the possible exception of strict rule-of-thumb consumers, changes in
the marginal tax rates on capital and labor (MTRKand MTRL,respectively)
may affect consumption choices. These considerations generate an Euler
speciﬁcation of the following form:
(6) ∆Ct =α+λ ∆ YDt +γ 1∆Wt−1 +γ 2∆Bt−1 +ϕ 1∆GSt
+ϕ 2∆MTRKt +ϕ 3∆MTRLt + ut,
where GS is again government purchases and the error term ut is uncorre-
lated with all variables in earlier time periods.
This Euler equation has a number of interesting properties. First, it
allows for the presence of both rule-of-thumb consumers and life-cycle
consumers, and it contains Ricardian equivalence as the special case where
λ=γ 1 =γ 2 = 0.98 Thus the equation allows for testing of Ricardian equiva-
lence in a utility-maximizing framework that nests both Ricardian and sev-
eral non-Ricardian hypotheses and shows the quantitative importance of
any deviations from Ricardian equivalence.
Second, with a little transformation the equation is not that differ-
ent from the consumption function specification developed by Kormendi
(equation 1). In the notation used earlier in the paper, disposable income
can be written as YD = NNP − TX − RE + TR + GINT. When that expres-
sion is substituted into equation 6 and the coefficients on each com-
ponent of disposable income are allowed to vary, the resulting equation
differs from equation 1 only in that equation 1 contains a lagged NNP
term and equation 6 includes marginal tax rate terms.
To isolate the effects of federal taxes on consumption, we decompose
the disposable income term in equation 6 into pretax income (YP), federal
taxes (TXF), and state and local taxes (TXSL). This yields equation 7,
which we estimate by OLS and instrumental variables in the next section:
(7) ∆Ct =α+λ 1∆YPt +λ 2∆TXFt +λ 3∆TXSLt +γ 1∆Wt−1
+γ 2∆Bt−1 +ϕ 1∆GSt +ϕ 2∆MTRKt +ϕ 3∆MTRLt + ut.
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98. These restrictions derive directly from the Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990) and
Blanchard (1985) models.
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 139Euler Equation Results
Table 4 presents estimates of equation 7 for the period 1956–2002.99
The top panel presents the results of OLS regressions, for compari-
son with table 2. The results using first differences of levels and those
using first differences scaled by lagged income are somewhat smaller
than those in table 2 and suggest that between 22 and 39 cents of each
dollar in federal tax cuts is consumed in the year the tax cuts occur. The
results using the first difference in ratios are substantially larger, sug-
gesting that between 50 and 70 cents per dollar of tax cuts is consumed
in the first year. Thus the results show no obvious bias relative to the find-
ings in table 2.
These results, of course, still suffer from endogeneity problems. We
therefore follow Campbell and Mankiw in using lagged values of the
right-hand-side variables as instruments for their current value, and lagged
values of consumption itself as an instrument for current income.100 In
models where agents are forward-looking, lagged consumption will help
to predict current income but is not correlated with the stochastic com-
ponent of current consumption. For reasons discussed by Robert Hall,
Campbell and Mankiw, and others,101 we avoid using once-lagged vari-
ables as instruments and instead use variables that are lagged twice and
three times.
The middle panel of table 4 reports instrumental variables estimates in
which all of the current-period variables are treated as endogenous except
for private sector wealth and government bonds, which are measured 
at the end of the previous period and are treated as exogenous. All of 
the regressions report negative effects of tax revenue on consumption.
Most of the effects are statistically significant, ranging between 32 and 
64 cents per dollar of tax cuts. The regressions that control for marginal
tax rates usually produce larger (in absolute value) effects of tax cuts on
consumption.
140 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
99. Given the lags and the choice of instruments, the availability of the tax rate variables
restricts consideration to samples starting in 1956. When the tax rate variables are dropped,
regressions with samples that begin earlier in the 1950s are possible. These regressions yield
results very similar to those of regressions without marginal tax rates where the sample
begins in 1956.
100. Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1990).
101. Hall (1988); Campbell and Mankiw (1989).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 140Table 4. Euler Equation OLS and Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effects of Taxes on Aggregate Consumptiona
Variables entered as ﬁrst Variables entered as ﬁrst
Variables entered as ﬁrst differences of ratios to NNP differences of levels, scaled
differences of levels per capita to NNP per capita
Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal
tax rate tax rate tax rate tax rate tax rate tax rate
Dependent variable excluded included excluded included excluded included
OLS estimates
Kormendi consumption  −0.38 −0.39 −0.70 −0.56 −0.25 −0.27
measure (0.15) (0.16) (0.19) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Expenditure on nondurables  −0.27 −0.26 −0.65 −0.50 −0.22 −0.22
and services (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09)
Sample period 1954–2002 1956–2002 1954–2002 1956–2002 1954–2002 1956–2002
Instrumental variables, current
explanatory variables endogenous
Kormendi consumption  −0.51 −0.64 −0.56 −0.38 −0.30 −0.45
measure (0.23) (0.20) (0.28) (0.31) (0.22) (0.18)
Expenditure on nondurables  −0.32 −0.41 −0.51 −0.29 −0.22 −0.32
and services (0.18) (0.16) (0.26) (0.31) (0.20) (0.16)
Sample period 1957–2002 1959–2002 1957–2002 1959–2002 1957–2002 1959–2002
Instrumental variables, all explanatory 
variables endogenous
Kormendi consumption  −0.62 −0.98 −0.75 −0.61 −0.44 −0.73
measure (0.40) (0.41) (0.43) (0.50) (0.35) (0.34)
Expenditure on nondurables  −0.42 −0.85 −0.70 −0.53 −0.51 −0.71
and services (0.35) (0.44) (0.41) (0.53) (0.39) (0.36)
Sample period 1957–2002 1959–2002 1957–2002 1959–2002 1957–2002 1959–2002
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Gravelle (2004); Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve; U.S. Census
Bureau; and Standard and Poor’s.















































1The bottom panel of table 4 reports the effects on consumption when
all right-hand-side variables, including the lagged value of private sector
wealth and government bonds, are treated as endogenous. These results
uniformly show a larger (in absolute value) effect of tax revenue on con-
sumption. Six of the twelve regressions generate statistically significant
effects, with coefﬁcients ranging from 71 to 98 cents in added consump-
tion per dollar of taxes cut. All six have p-values below .10, and in three
the p-value is below .05. The other six regressions also show large effects
(44 to 62 cents on the dollar) but are estimated less precisely.
Table 5 reports the coefficients on all regressors for the six instru-
mental variables regressions in table 4 that include marginal tax rates as
explanatory variables. Before-tax income and federal tax revenue usually
enter as important determinants of aggregate consumption. Most of the
other variables do not. In particular, marginal tax rates have much smaller
and less significant effects in this specification than in the consumption
function specification. Government bonds have negative coefficients
when they are not instrumented and positive coefficients when they are,
but in neither case are the estimates statistically different from zero. Like-
wise, private sector wealth enters with a small, positive, but usually sta-
tistically insignificant coefficient. The state and local tax variable
generally enters positively but is estimated imprecisely. The fact that
standard errors are larger across the board is not unexpected in instru-
mental variables estimates, and they serve to highlight the generally sta-
tistically significant and economically substantial effects of federal taxes
on consumption.
Discussion
The results just presented establish that changes in tax revenue can have sig-
nificant negative effects on contemporaneous changes in consumption
when government purchases, marginal tax rates, and other factors are con-
trolled for. The implications of these findings for Ricardian equivalence
merit additional discussion. Define a Ricardian consumer as one who
would have a zero marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of a current
tax cut if all of the following assumptions hold: all taxes are lump-sum, the
tax cut is coupled with a future lump-sum tax increase of equivalent pres-
ent value on the consumer or the consumer’s heirs; the future income of the
consumer and his or her heirs is known; and government purchases are
unaffected.
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2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 142Table 5. Instrumental Variables Coefﬁcient Estimates for All Independent Variables in the Euler Equationa
Variables entered as ﬁrst Variables entered as ﬁrst
Variables entered as ﬁrst differences of ratios to NNP differences of levels, scaled
differences of levels per capita to NNP per capita
Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables
consumption and services consumption and services consumption and services
Independent variable measure expenditure measure expenditure measure expenditure
Current independent variables endogenous
Before-tax income 0.41 0.36 0.94 0.89 0.41 0.41
(0.17) (0.14) (0.27) (0.25) (0.13) (0.13)
Government purchases 0.25 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.11
(0.29) (0.24) (0.27) (0.28) (0.20) (0.19)
Federal taxes −0.64 −0.41 −0.38 −0.29 −0.45 −0.32
(0.20) (0.16) (0.31) (0.31) (0.18) (0.16)
State and local taxes 0.22 0.74 −0.16 0.09 0.48 0.83
(0.80) (0.66) (0.85) (0.87) (0.54) (0.52)
Lagged government debt −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Lagged wealth 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Marginal tax rate on capitalb 2.60 1.50 0.00 −0.10 0.10 0.10
(1.60) (1.30) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Marginal tax rate on laborb −0.70 −0.90 0.00 −0.10 0.00 0.00
(1.40) (1.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.00)
Constant 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
















































3Table 5. Instrumental Variables Coefﬁcient Estimates for All Independent Variables in the Euler Equationa (continued)
Variables entered as ﬁrst Variables entered as ﬁrst
Variables entered as ﬁrst differences of ratios to NNP differences of levels, scaled
differences of levels per capita to NNP per capita
Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables Kormendi Nondurables
consumption and services consumption and services consumption and services
Independent variable measure expenditure measure expenditure measure expenditure
All explanatory variables endogenous
Before-tax income 0.52 0.49 0.89 0.84 0.48 0.51
(0.26) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.18) (0.20)
Government purchases 0.16 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.07
(0.40) (0.40) (0.31) (0.33) (0.25) (0.28)
Federal taxes −0.98 −0.85 −0.61 −0.53 −0.73 −0.71
(0.41) (0.44) (0.50) (0.53) (0.34) (0.36)
State and local taxes 0.36 0.65 0.09 0.34 0.47 0.76
(1.04) (1.06) (0.98) (1.00) (0.69) (0.76)
Lagged government debt 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Lagged wealth 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Marginal tax rate on capitalb 2.50 1.30 0.00 −0.10 0.10 0.10
(2.30) (2.30) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Marginal tax rate on laborb 0.60 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(2.30) (2.30) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Constant 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Gravelle (2004); Department of the Treasury; Federal Reserve; U.S. Census Bureau; and
Standard and Poor’s.
a. Table reports regression coefﬁcients for all independent variables in the regressions including the marginal tax rate in the bottom two panels of table 4. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
Number of observations N = 44. All lags are one-period lags. Consumption measures are as deﬁned in table 2.















































4It is well established that a Ricardian consumer can have a nonzero
MPC out of a tax cut if any of these assumptions is violated. As a result,
interpreting our empirical results requires some care. We make two broad
points. First, violations of several of the assumptions above can generate
nonzero MPCs for Ricardian consumers but seem unlikely to explain our
empirical results, which generate MPCs between 50 and 80 percent. Sec-
ond, the violations that can explain such high MPCs out of tax cuts also
generate strongly non-Ricardian effects of public policies even if con-
sumers are Ricardian in the sense defined above.
On the first point: violations of several of the assumptions may indeed
exist in the real world but are unlikely to explain our results. If taxes are
distortionary, tax cuts will alter relative prices and hence affect con-
sumption and labor supply through standard substitution effects. How-
ever, the marginal propensity to consume out of a temporary tax cut
created by distortionary taxes is likely to be either small or negative for
Ricardian consumers.102
Likewise, the “fiscal rule” that households believe to be operating will
affect the MPC, but it is unlikely that uncertainty about fiscal rules can
explain our results. If the path of government purchases is held constant
and future income is known, but the incidence of the future lump-sum tax
is uncertain (in terms of either the timing or who will be affected), a lump-
sum tax cut now coupled with a lump-sum tax increase later could lead
Ricardian consumers to increase their precautionary saving. That is, they
would save not only the tax cut but also an additional amount to account
for the increased riskiness of future taxes. This would generate a negative
MPC out of the tax cut.103Clearly, this cannot explain the MPCs estimated
above.
The more likely it is that a tax cut will be financed by reductions in
future government purchases, the more likely that the MPC out of a tax cut
will be positive for Ricardian consumers, because such a tax cut would
imply that the burden of future taxes would also fall—that is, that the tax
cut would be permanent. But current tax revenue does not appear to be a
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102. Cardia (1997) shows that, in simulation models that would generate Ricardian
equivalence but for the presence of distortionary taxes, or distortionary taxes in combination
with ﬁnite horizons, the estimated MPC out of a tax cut in equations like those estimated in
this paper is less than .08. Judd (1987b) shows that, in an inﬁnite-horizon model, the MPC
out of a temporary cut in tax rates, coupled with a future increase in tax rates, is negative.
103. Barro (1989); Kormendi (1983); Seater (1993).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 145good predictor of future government purchases, and so it is unlikely that
changing views of government purchases explain our results.104
On the second point: simulation models suggest that, if future income is
uncertain or if taxes serve a social insurance role in reducing the amplitude
of swings in uncertain future income, the MPC out of a tax cut could be
within the 50 to 80 percent range that we estimate.105In this case consumers
are “Ricardian” in the sense deﬁned above, but intergenerational transfers
of public resources have long-lasting, strongly non-Ricardian effects on the
economy.
A related issue is that our empirical consumption results address only
short-term Ricardian equivalence. In some models Ricardian equivalence
fails in the short run but holds in the long run.106 In others, small deviations
from short-term Ricardian equivalence grow over time into very large devi-
ations from long-term Ricardian equivalence.107
Thus our empirical ﬁndings cannot distinguish between the view that
consumers are truly non-Ricardian and the view that consumers are Ricar-
dian but that the characteristics of enacted policies do not conform to the
assumptions stated above under which Ricardian equivalence holds. In
either case, however, our results imply that, controlling for other factors, tax
cut–induced deﬁcits reduce national saving, at least in the short run. This is
the sense in which we describe our results as “non-Ricardian.”
Summary
Our consumption function OLS regressions demonstrate robust non-
Ricardian effects even within the basic specification that has previously
suggested the strongest support for Ricardian equivalence. When the sam-
ple period is extended to cover the most recent years, federal and state tax
variables are split, and a marginal tax rate variable is included, the results
suggest that about 30 to 46 cents of every dollar in tax cuts is spent in the
same year—and the effect is precisely estimated in all speciﬁcations that
use the full sample period.
The OLS regressions likely suffer from severe simultaneity problems,
however. When instrumental variables regressions are used in the Euler
146 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
104. Modigliani and Sterling (1986) and Feldstein and Elmendorf (1990) report regres-
sions of current government purchases on lagged values of tax revenue, controlling for other
factors, and ﬁnd no predictive power of tax revenue for future purchases.
105. Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986); Feldstein (1988).
106. Smetters (1999); Mankiw (2000b).
107. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
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ments, the results are generally more strongly non-Ricardian. If we drop
the highest and lowest estimates in the bottom panel of table 4, the
remaining coefficients from this specification, which is our preferred
one, suggest that about 50 to 85 cents of every dollar in tax cuts is spent
in the first year; half of the effects are measured precisely. This range is
consistent with some previous assessments,108 but it is inconsistent with
the Ricardian prediction of a full offset from private saving, and the dif-
ference, as we will discuss further in the concluding section, is econom-
ically important.
Deﬁcits and Interest Rates
In this section we present our ﬁndings on the effects of deﬁcits and other
ﬁscal measures on long-term interest rates. We begin by reviewing previ-
ous research on this issue.
Previous Research
For a number of well-known reasons, the effects of ﬁscal policy on inter-
est rates have proved difﬁcult to pin down statistically. The issues include
the appropriate definitions of deficits and debt, whether deficits or debt
should be the variable of interest, how to distinguish expected from un-
expected changes in these variables, and the potential endogeneity of many
of the key explanatory variables. We discuss several of these issues below.109
In part because of these statistical issues, the evidence from the empiri-
cal literature as a whole is mixed.110
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108. For example, Bernheim (1987) and the CBO (“Description of Economic Models,”
November 1998) conclude that private saving would rise by between 20 and 50 percent of an
increase in the deﬁcit (hence consumption would rise by between 50 and 80 percent of the
increase in the deﬁcit). Elmendorf and Liebman (2000) conclude that private saving would
offset 25 percent of the increase in the deﬁcit. Gale and Potter (2002) estimate that private
saving will offset 31 percent of the decline in public saving caused by the 2001 tax cut.
109. Bernheim (1987), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), and Seater (1993) provide com-
prehensive analyses.
110. Previous analyses reach widely varying conclusions about the effects of deﬁcits on
interest rates. For example, Barth and others (1991) survey forty-two studies through 1989,
seventeen of which found a “predominately signiﬁcant, positive” effect of deﬁcits on inter-
est rates (that is, larger deficits raised interest rates); six studies found mixed effects, and
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a priori view regarding whether interest rates should be affected by deﬁcits
or by debt. Below, however, we often refer to the relationship between
interest rates and “deﬁcits,” in part for simplicity and in part because our
results suggest that deficits contain more useful information than debt in
explaining interest rates.
PROJECTED DEFICITS AND INTEREST RATES. Our previous contribution to
interpreting the literature has been to highlight the key role of using
expected deﬁcits rather than current deﬁcits.111 Almost twenty years ago,
Feldstein wrote, “it is wrong to relate the rate of interest to the concurrent
budget deficit without taking into account the anticipated future deficits.
It is significant that almost none of the past empirical analyses of the
effect of deficits on interest rates makes any attempt to include a measure
of expected future deﬁcits.”112 Since ﬁnancial markets are forward-looking,
excluding expectations could bias the analysis toward ﬁnding no relationship
between interest rates and deﬁcits.113
Over the past twenty years, many studies have incorporated more accurate
information on expectations of future sustained deﬁcits. These studies tend to
ﬁnd economically and statistically signiﬁcant connections between anticipated
deﬁcits and current interest rates. In a recent paper we summarize the ﬁndings
of the studies on this topic reviewed by James Barth and others as well as
148 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
nineteen found “predominately insignificant or negative” effects. Barth and others (p. 72)
conclude that “Since the available evidence on the effects of deﬁcits is mixed, one cannot
say with complete conﬁdence that budget deﬁcits raise interest rates. . . . But, equally impor-
tant, one cannot say that they do not have these effects.” Other reviewers of the literature
have reached similar conclusions. Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999, p. 1658) note that “Our
view is that this literature . . . is not very informative.” Bernheim (1989, p. 56) writes that “it
is easy to cite a large number of studies that support any conceivable position.” Appendix
table A-1 updates the Barth and others (1991) survey and shows that, of more than sixty stud-
ies, roughly half found a predominantly signiﬁcant, positive effect and the other half found
either no effect or mixed effects.
111. Gale and Orszag (2002, 2003a). One recent study expands the literature along a dif-
ferent dimension: Kiley (2003) examines the relationship between current government debt
and the return to capital in the nonﬁnancial corporate sector. Kiley ﬁnds that a 1-percentage-
point increase in the debt-GDP ratio is associated with a 10-basis-point increase in the return
to capital.
112. Feldstein (1986).
113. Bernheim (1987) notes that, if households perfectly anticipate future deﬁcits, one
may well find no empirical relationship between current deficits and interest rates, even
though the path of interest rates and economic activity would be substantially different in the
absence of the deﬁcits.
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papers that incorporate timely information on projected deficits, thirteen
ﬁnd predominantly positive, signiﬁcant effects between anticipated deﬁcits
and current interest rates, five find mixed effects, and only one finds no
effects. The studies that find no significant effect are disproportionately
those that do not take expectations into account at all or do so only indi-
rectly through a vector autoregression. Thus, although the literature as a
whole, taken at face value, generates mixed results, those analyses that
focus on the effects of anticipated deﬁcits tend to ﬁnd a positive and sig-
niﬁcant impact on interest rates.
The challenge in incorporating market expectations about future deﬁcits
is that such expectations are not directly observable. An important caveat
to the literature examining expected deﬁcits, then, is that, to the extent that
proxies for expected deﬁcits are imperfect reﬂections of current expecta-
tions, the coefﬁcient on the projected deﬁcit will tend to be biased toward
zero because of classical measurement error, and the tendency will be to
underestimate the effects of deﬁcits on interest rates.
Researchers have used different strategies in the face of this challenge.
One approach is to use published forecasts of the deﬁcit as a proxy for mar-
ket expectations. For example, Elmendorf, using deﬁcit forecasts from Data
Resources, Inc., ﬁnds that an increase in the projected deﬁcit of 1 percent of
GNP raises ﬁve-year bond yields by 43 basis points. Matthew Canzoneri,
Robert Cumby, and Behzad Diba, using CBO projections, find that “an
increase in projected future deﬁcits averaging 1 percent of current GDP is
associated with an increase in the long-term interest rate relative to the
short-term interest rate of 53 to 60 basis points.”115
One potential concern with these studies is that the business cycle
could be affecting current yields.116 Thomas Laubach suggests a novel
way to resolve this issue:117 he examines the relationship between pro-
jected deficits (or debt) and the level of real forward (five-year-ahead)
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114. Gale and Orszag (2003a); Barth and others (1991).
115. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002, p. 365).
116. For example, in a recession the projected unified deficit could increase merely
because of the lingering effects from the rise in debt during the downturn; at the same time,
the yield curve could steepen as short-term interest rates are depressed by Federal Reserve
policy. This could potentially introduce an artiﬁcial relationship, actually driven by the busi-
ness cycle and monetary policy, between the yield spread and the projected uniﬁed deﬁcit.
117. Laubach (2003).
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cycle conditions should not influence the long-term rates expected to pre-
vail beginning five years from now. Laubach uses CBO and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) deficit and debt projections and finds
that a 1-percentage-point increase in the ﬁve-year-ahead projected deﬁcit-
GDP ratio raises the five-year-ahead interest rate on ten-year Treasury
notes by between 24 and 39 basis points, and that a 1-percentage-point
increase in the projected debt-GDP ratio raises the same long-term forward
rate by between 3.5 and 5.6 basis points.
Following Laubach but controlling for additional variables, Engen and
Hubbard use CBO projections and obtain somewhat smaller effects.118
They find that an increase in the projected deficit equal to 1 percent of
GDP raises the five-year-ahead ten-year rate (the same rate Laubach
examines) by 18 basis points, and that an increase in the projected debt
equal to 1 percent of GDP raises the forward long-term rate by between
2.8 and 3.3 basis points.
For Laubach and for Engen and Hubbard, the deﬁcit-based results are not
dissimilar from the debt-based results. Consider, for example, an increase
in the budget deﬁcit equal to 1 percent of GDP in each year over the next
ten years. By the end of the ten years, such an increase will have raised gov-
ernment debt by roughly 10 percent of GDP. The deﬁcit-based results found
by Laubach would suggest about a 30-basis-point increase in interest rates
in this scenario, whereas the debt-based results would suggest about a 
45-basis-point increase. Likewise, the deﬁcit-based results of Engen and
Hubbard would suggest an increase in long-term rates of roughly 20 basis
points, and their debt-based results suggest an increase of roughly 30 basis
points (ten times the effect for an increase of 1 percent of GDP).
A second approach to incorporating expected deﬁcits involves event
analysis of news reports about deﬁcit reduction legislation or budget pro-
jections. This approach examines the change in interest rates (or other vari-
ables) on the day on which deﬁcit news is released. For example, Elmendorf
examines ﬁnancial market reactions to events surrounding passage of the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation in 1985 and the Budget Enforcement
Act of 1990;119 he concludes that “higher expected government spending
and budget deﬁcits raised real interest rates . . . while lower expected spend-
150 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
118. Engen and Hubbard (2004).
119. Elmendorf (1996).
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measure market expectations, this approach does not permit a mapping
between the size of the unanticipated deﬁcit and the interest rate effect.121
Notably, the results of most studies using either of the two approaches to
incorporating anticipated deﬁcits are consistent with the range of 20 to 60
basis points for an increase in projected deﬁcits equal to 1 percent of GDP
over ten years mentioned by us in a previous paper, and with the range of
30 to 60 basis points proposed by Robert Rubin, Orszag, and Allen Sinai.122
This range is also consistent with the results of large macroeconometric
models.123 The simpliﬁed Solow model and debt calculation discussed
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 151
120. The Council of Economic Advisers (Economic Report of the President,1994, p. 78),
studying the events surrounding passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,
concluded that event analysis “linking the announcement and enactment of credible budget
reduction to changes in the long-term interest rate . . . provides support for the view that the
interest rate declines were largely due to budget policy.”
121. Several other papers examine interest rate changes surrounding the release of new
budget projections. Thorbecke (1993) uses OMB and CBO projections and finds that a
$100 billion increase in the deficit (relative to the previously projected level) is associated
with an immediate increase in ten-year interest rates of 14 to 26 basis points. Quigley and
Porter-Hudak (1994) use CBO and OMB projections and find that a 1 percent increase in
the deficit itself (not as a percentage of GDP) raises short-term interest rates by 0.37 to
0.87 basis point. Assuming a baseline deficit of 2 percent of GDP, their result implies that
an increase in the deficit of 1 percent of GDP (a 50 percent increase in the deficit) would
raise short-term interest rates by 18.5 to 43.5 basis points. Kitchen (1996) uses changes in
OMB forecasts and finds a statistically significant but quite modest effect: an increase in
the deficit projection of 1 percent of GDP raises ten-year bond yields by 3.4 basis points
for one-year budget projections. He finds even smaller effects for multiyear budget pro-
jections on long-term interest rates. Calomiris and others (2004) examine announcement
effects about previous deficits, rather than announcement effects about future deficits or
future legislation. They find no effects on current interest rates of the announcement of the
previous month’s deficit. Their deficit measure, however, is based on the monthly budget
updates provided by the CBO and the Department of the Treasury. These monthly updates
are quite noisy and depend on factors such as the timing of defense contract payments. The
variation in the monthly data is thus unlikely to provide significant information about the
budget outlook.
122. Gale and Orszag (2003a); Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004). Brook (2003) similarly
concludes that “most empirical work conducted in the past ten years estimates the impact on
US real long-term interest rates of a sustained 1 percentage point decrease in the US ﬁscal
position to be in the range of 20–40 basis points, and the impact on the slope of the yield
curve to be in the range of 10–60 basis points.”
123. Almost all major macroeconometric models imply an economically significant
connection between changes in budget deficits and changes in long-term interest rates. The
precise effects depend on a wide variety of factors, including whether the change in the
deficit is caused by a change in taxes or a change in spending, how monetary policy reacts,
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 151above generate somewhat larger numbers, but those calculations assume a
closed economy. In a large open economy like the United States, the effect
of deﬁcits on interest rates would be expected to be somewhat smaller, and
this is consistent with the empirical evidence summarized above.
VECTOR AUTOREGRESSIONS. Some of the most frequently cited papers
that find no effect of deficits on interest rates, including those by Evans
and by Charles Plosser, employ vector autoregressions (VARs).124 The
VARs in these studies are typically based on a very limited number of
variables and only on past values of such variables; they ignore informa-
tion on current and projected deficits that is not reflected in such variables
but may be widely known to market participants. As a result, the VAR-
based projections have been shown to be inferior to those produced by the
OMB or Data Resources, Inc.125 The implication is that VAR-based pro-
jections based on past values of variables are more likely to suffer from
measurement error and thus to be biased toward showing no effect of
deficits on interest rates.126
Despite these limitations, several recent papers have applied the VAR
methodology to examining the connection between deficits and interest
rates. For example, Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba include both the federal
funds rate and the ten-year bond rate in a structural VAR; they ﬁnd that the
ten-year yield rises by 45 basis points immediately, and by roughly 40 basis
points in the long run, in response to an upward spending shock equal to 
1 percent of GDP.127 Engen and Hubbard use a VAR framework that
includes anticipateddeﬁcits to estimate that an increase in the federal deﬁcit
equal to 1 percent of GDP causes the real interest rate to rise by 12 basis
152 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
and how foreign governments react. The results vary widely, in part because different poli-
cies are simulated and standardization is difficult, but suggest that a sustained increase in
the primary (noninterest) deficit of 1 percent of GDP would raise interest rates by 40 to 
50 basis points after one year and 50 to 100 basis points after ten years (see Gale and
Orszag, 2002).
124. Evans (1987a, 1987b); Plosser (1982, 1987a).
125. Bernheim (1987); Cohen and Garnier (1991); Elmendorf (1993).
126. These studies have also been criticized on other grounds. For example, the tests
appear to have very little power and in some cases are even unable to reject the hypothesis
that expected inﬂation has no effect on nominal interest rates, and the results are not robust
to changes in sample period or speciﬁcation. For further discussion see Bernheim (1987) and
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999). A recent study by Kormendi and Protopapadakis (2004)
shares the characteristic of estimating the effects on interest rates of a deﬁcit measure that
depends only on past values of the explanatory variables.
127. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2002).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 152points.128 Qiang Dai and Thomas Philippon estimate a structural VAR that
uses information provided by no-arbitrage restrictions on the yield curve.129
They conclude that a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the uniﬁed deﬁcit raises
ten-year bond yields by 41 basis points. Silvia Ardagna, Francesco Caselli,
and Timothy Lane, using data from a panel of sixteen advanced industrial
countries over several decades, show in a VAR that a 1-percent-of-GDP
increase in the primary deﬁcit leads to a cumulative increase in interest rates
of almost 150 basis points over ten years.130 They also show that the initial,
static effect of such an increase is in the neighborhood of 10 basis points.
Speciﬁcation
To examine these issues we follow Laubach and Engen and Hubbard
and undertake reduced-form regressions of the following generic form:131
it =α+β ft +Γ Z +ε t,
where i is a measure of the interest rate, f is a measure of ﬁscal policy, and
Z is a vector of control variables.132
Our primary interest is in the coefﬁcient β, which estimates the effect of
the ﬁscal policy variable on interest rates. We examine the role of several
such variables, each expressed as a share of GDP, at different time periods:
federal publicly held debt, the uniﬁed deﬁcit, the primary deﬁcit, and pri-
mary outlays and revenue.
Since it is conceivable that both stock and ﬂow measures of ﬁscal policy
matter, and that the effect of a change in one ﬁscal variable could depend on
the level of the other, we include both debt and deﬁcits in some of the regres-
sions.133 The regressions that separate primary outlays and revenue provide
insight to the extent that, as noted in the discussion of Ricardian equiva-
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128. Engen and Hubbard (2004).
129. Dai and Phillippon (2004).
130. Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004).
131. Laubach (2003); Engen and Hubbard (2004).
132. Details of the variable definitions and sources used in these regressions may be
found at www.brookings.edu/es/commentary/journals/bpea-macro/2004_2_bpea_interest
data.pdf or obtained from the authors on request.
133. Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004, p. 4) include both debt and deficits in their
model, for similar reasons: “. . . in theory, the relationship between ﬁscal policy and interest
rates may be mediated by either variable. . . . Furthermore, even if one were specifically
interested in the effects of only one of these variables, it would still make sense to control
for the other. For example, given the current stock of debt, including the deficit may help
[control] for the expected future path of the debt itself.”
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 153lence above, changes in outlays could have different effects on national
saving and thus on interest rates than changes in revenue.134 We undertake
several different versions of our generic regression, all of them using data
from 1976 to 2004:
—Effects of projected ﬁscal policy on forward interest rates. Our pre-
ferred speciﬁcations examine the relationship between forward long-term
interest rates and projected ﬁscal variables. This speciﬁcation comes clos-
est to eliminating the confounding effect of current macroeconomic con-
ditions on both interest rates and deﬁcits: most projections assume that the
economy will be operating at full employment within a relatively short pro-
jection period into the future. In these speciﬁcations, it reﬂects the simple
average of one-year-forward interest rates from five to fourteen years
ahead, calculated from the yield curve for zero-coupon bonds.135 This pro-
vides a forward ten-year interest rate. The ﬁscal policy measures ftare mea-
sured five years ahead, as a share of projected GDP in that year, and are
taken from the CBO baseline projections.
—Effects of projected fiscal policy on current interest rates. In these
regressions, it is the current ten-year constant-maturity Treasury yield
rather than the forward yield. The ﬁscal measures are the same as above.
—Effects of current fiscal policy on current interest rates. In these
regressions we examine the relationship between current long-term rates
and current rather than projected fiscal policy outcomes. The fiscal mea-
sures are all for the current year.
We perform (but do not always report) each regression using both real
and nominal values of the variables. We compute the real interest rate by
adjusting the nominal rate for the long-term inﬂationary expectations series
incorporated in the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US macroeconomic
model.136 In the regressions explaining the nominal interest rate, the in-
flationary expectations series is included as an explanatory variable. In
154 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
134. Ricardian equivalence is a statement about the effects of variations in the timing of
lump-sum tax payments, holding constant both the path of transfers and government pur-
chases. Our regressions separate tax revenue from purchases and transfers.
135. These variables and some of the other data used in this study come from Thomas
Laubach and Eric Engen. The forward interest rate is computed from the zero-coupon yield
curve as of the last trading day for the month of the CBO projection.
136. Since 1991:3, this series is based on that of the Survey of Professional Forecasters
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. An appendix to Laubach (2003)
describes this series before 1991:3.
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twelve-month period.
All regressions include a constant term and an estimate of the GDP
growth rate. The equations using projected ﬁscal policy include the growth rate
projected by the CBO ﬁve years ahead. The equations using current ﬁscal
policy measures include the current growth rate.
We include several additional control variables, since macroeconomic
conditions can affect the level of interest rates associated with any given ﬁs-
cal policy outcome. We include a dummy variable for periods when the
economy is in recession (as determined by the Business Cycle Dating Com-
mittee of the National Bureau of Economic Research); the variable is both
entered on its own and interacted with the ﬁscal measures. The purpose of
this dummy and interaction term is to examine whether, even when con-
trolling for projected GDP growth, future ﬁscal policy outcomes have a dif-
ferent effect on interest rates during a recession than during a recovery.137
Following Laubach and Engen and Hubbard,138we include a measure of
the equity premium, which is intended to control for changes in risk aver-
sion, which in turn could affect interest rates. The measure is defined as
dividend income, from the National Income and Product Accounts, divided
by the market value of corporate equities held by households, from the Fed-
eral Reserve’s Flow of Funds accounts, plus the trend growth rate in real
GDP, minus the real yield on ten-year Treasury notes.139 We follow Engen
and Hubbard in controlling for Federal Reserve holdings (in the debt equa-
tions) and purchases (in the deficit equations) of Treasury securities as a
share of GDP, as a way of controlling for monetary policy.140 We also fol-
low Engen and Hubbard in including an oil price variable.141
Finally, Engen and Hubbard include a dummy variable for changes in
defense spending, deﬁned as the defense dummy variable constructed by
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 155
137. Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004) raised such a possibility.
138. Laubach (2003); Engen and Hubbard (2004).
139. Laubach (2003).
140. The results were not affected by substituting the federal funds rate or the three-
month Treasury rate for Federal Reserve purchases or holdings of Treasury securities.
141. Engen and Hubbard (2004) cite evidence in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and
Barro (1991) that real oil prices can affect real interest rates. We include the spot price for
West Texas Intermediate crude oil, adjusted by the GDP deﬂator. This oil price series is
slightly different from that in Engen and Hubbard (2004). The empirical results are unaffected
by this difference.
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 155Valerie Ramey and Shapiro, augmented to include the military buildup in
2002.142 We are skeptical that this variable is capturing significant shifts
in defense spending, however. The Engen-Hubbard indicator variable is
set equal to 1 only in 1980 and 2002. Yet increases in defense spending
as a share of GDP were larger in 1981, 1982, 1983, and 2003 than in 1980
(figure 10). Another concern is that a sustained defense buildup should
have lasting effects on interest rates, not a one-year effect as their dummy
variable implies. Moreover, the decline in defense spending following
the collapse of the Soviet Union might also rightfully be considered a
noteworthy event in trends in defense spending.143 For these reasons we
use actual defense spending as a share of GDP as a control variable,
rather than the dummy variable.
Because some of the regression results suggested evidence of ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation in the error term, we use robust standard errors when esti-
156 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
142. Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
143. It is also worth noting that, in Ramey and Shapiro (1998, ﬁgure 6d), the effect on
interest rates of a defense spending shock in their model dies out after ﬁve years, so that there
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Source: CBO.
Figure 10. Defense Spending, 1976–2003
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mum likelihood to estimate a ﬁrst-order autoregressive model.144
Results
PROJECTED FISCAL POLICY AND FORWARD INTEREST RATES. Table 6 re-
ports results of OLS regressions in which the real forward (five-year-
ahead) long-term interest rate is the dependent variable. The ﬁndings leave
two broad impressions. First, a robust, economically and statistically sig-
nificant relationship is observed between forward long-term real interest
rates and projected fiscal imbalances. Second, the R2 statistics show that
there is more information in the projected deﬁcit variables than in the pro-
jected debt variables.
We begin with the simplest formulations (columns 6-1 through 6-4),
which include only the projected fiscal policy measure and the projected
GDP growth rate as control variables. An increase five years out in the
projected debt of 1 percent of GDP (column 6-1) raises the real forward
long-term interest rate by 4.9 basis points. An increase in the projected
unified deficit equal to 1 percent of GDP (column 6-2) raises the forward
long-term real interest rate by 29 basis points. An increase in the pro-
jected primary deficit of 1 percent of GDP (column 6-3) is associated
with a still-larger impact on the forward long-term rate of 40 basis points.
When revenue and primary outlays are entered separately, a projected
reduction in revenue of 1 percent of GDP ﬁve years out is estimated to raise
the forward long-term rate by 42 basis points, and a projected increase in
outlays of the same magnitude and timing raises the forward long-term
rate by 37 basis points. All of these estimates are significantly different
from zero.
Adding a recession dummy and a term interacting the dummy with the
fiscal policy variable (columns 6-5 through 6-8) raises the estimated co-
efficients on the fiscal variables slightly: the coefficient on the projected
primary deﬁcit, for example, rises from 40 to 45 basis points. The coefﬁ-
cients on the terms interacting the recession dummy and the projected ﬁs-
cal measures suggest that a given ﬁscal projection has a smaller (in absolute
value) effect on interest rates during a recession than during a period of full
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 157
144. Estimation is undertaken using the “arima” command in the STATA statistical soft-
ware package.
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Regression
Independent variable 6–16 –26 –36 –46 –56 –66 –76 –86 –96 –10 6–11 6–12
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP 0.049 0.056 0.038
(0.016) (0.018) (0.012)
Projected deﬁcit/GDP 0.293 0.315 0.282
(0.068) (0.070) (0.072)
Projected primary  0.395 0.445 0.388
deﬁcit/GDP (0.100) (0.091) (0.099)
Projected revenue/GDP −0.424 −0.531 −0.292
(0.203) (0.130) (0.133)
Projected primary  0.370 0.391 0.430
outlays/GDP (0.113) (0.141) (0.219)
Recession dummy and interactions
Recession dummy 2.913 1.615 1.128 −6.731 0.870 0.897 0.719 6.555
(0.554) (0.396) (0.484) (4.350) (1.031) (0.344) (0.334) (6.634)
Recession dummy × projected −0.043 −0.012
debt/GDP (0.025) (0.023)
Recession dummy × projected −0.178 −0.099
deﬁcit/GDP (0.109) (0.053)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.258 −0.152
primary deﬁcit/GDP (0.147) (0.075)
Recession dummy × projected 0.380 0.030
revenue/GDP (0.127) (0.157)
Recession dummy × projected 0.057 −0.356
















































Oil price 0.048 0.023 0.015 0.023
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Equity premiumb −0.283 −0.293 −0.338 −0.377
(0.161) (0.134) (0.143) (0.175)
Defense spending/GDP −0.041 −0.079 0.012 −0.028
(0.179) (0.141) (0.148) (0.195)
Federal Reserve holdings  −0.208
of Treasuries (0.345)
Federal Reserve purchases  −0.743 −0.690 −0.602
of Treasuries (0.755) (0.741) (0.821)
Projected GDP growth rate 0.555 0.278 0.185 0.204 0.296 0.034 −0.053 −0.001 0.152 0.346 0.363 0.311
(0.438) (0.300) (0.289) (0.264) (0.406) (0.233) (0.205) (0.208) (0.585) (0.521) (0.526) (0.554)
Constant 1.335 3.666 4.809 5.767 1.629 4.168 5.377 7.880 3.522 4.261 4.999 2.586
(1.593) (0.806) (0.799) (4.878) (1.687) (0.689) (0.494) (3.684) (2.276) (0.924) (0.880) (5.275)
Adjusted R2 .213 .436 .408 .386 .463 .642 .641 .636 .679 .779 .773 .758
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic
Research; Federal Reserve.
a. Sample period for all regressions is 1976–2004. All projected variables are ﬁve-year projections. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of observations N = 29.
b. Dividend component of national income as a percentage of the market value of corporate equity held (directly or indirectly) by households, minus the real ten-year Treasury yield, plus the real GDP growth rate















































9employment. Four of the five interaction terms have p-values below .12,
and one of these is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level. This suggests that the
effect of a projected deﬁcit on forward long-term rates may be smaller if
the economy is currently in recession than if it is not. This presents a puz-
zle, since it is unclear why a current recession should affect the relation-
ship between the two future variables.145
Adding the other control variables (monetary policy, defense spending,
the oil price, and the equity premium; columns 6-9 through 6-12) reduces
the estimated coefficients on the fiscal variables slightly: The coefficient
on the projected primary imbalance, for example, declines to 39 basis
points (column 6-11). The interaction between the recession dummy and
projected uniﬁed or primary deﬁcits remains statistically and economically
signiﬁcant (columns 6-10 and 6-11). Many of the additional control vari-
ables enter with the expected sign, but few are statistically signiﬁcant other
than the equity premium, which enters negatively.146The coefﬁcient on real
oil prices is positive and signiﬁcant in the debt equation (column 6-9), but
it is not statistically significant in the others. The coefficient on Federal
Reserve open-market purchases is negative but not statistically signiﬁcant.
Defense spending enters with a negative coefficient, but it is not statisti-
cally signiﬁcant.
Running the same regressions using the nominalforward long-term rate
as the dependent variable and including inﬂationary expectations as a right-
hand-side variable (table 7) generates similar ﬁscal effects. The coefﬁcient
on the projected primary deficit, for example, ranges between 33 and
46 basis points. The results in tables 6 and 7 underscore a robust, statisti-
cally significant connection between forward long-term interest rates and
projected ﬁscal policy outcomes.
Table 8 includes both projected debt and projected primary deﬁcit vari-
ables in the same regressions. To avoid double counting, we use projected
debt as a share of GDP at the end of year t + 4 and primary budget mea-
160 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
145. Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004) hypothesize, based mostly on Rubin’s experience
with real-world ﬁnancial markets, that “it is possible during economic downturns that ﬁnan-
cial markets do not focus on long-term ﬁscal issues; if this is the case, the effect of the ﬁscal
deterioration on long-term interest rates will manifest itself only as the economy recovers.”
We have not evaluated whether arbitrage based on this evidence would generate expected
proﬁts after taking into account trading costs and other factors.
146. The same result is observed in Laubach (2003) and Engen and Hubbard (2004).
(text continues on page 164)
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Regression
Independent variable 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 7-11 7-12
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP 0.035 0.056 0.038
(0.019) (0.020) (0.011)
Projected deﬁcit/GDP 0.250 0.351 0.281
(0.096) (0.085) (0.073)
Projected primary 0.329 0.464 0.384
deﬁcit/GDP (0.127) (0.112) (0.098)
Projected revenue/GDP −0.400 −0.527 −0.229
(0.180) (0.126) (0.123)
Projected primary 0.245 0.398 0.458
outlays/GDP (0.147) (0.256) (0.238)
Recession dummy and interactions
Recession dummy 2.874 1.850 1.201 −6.515 1.243 0.988 0.750 9.254
(0.691) (0.491) (0.512) (6.437) (1.168) (0.432) (0.347) (7.462)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.042 −0.021
debt/GDP (0.026) (0.030)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.206 −0.105
deﬁcit/GDP (0.122) (0.057)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.271 −0.149
primary deﬁcit/GDP (0.160) (0.074)
Recession dummy × projected 0.375 −0.037
revenue/GDP (0.130) (0.159)
Recession dummy × projected 0.050 −0.430
















































1Table 7. OLS Estimates of the Effects of Projected Fiscal Variables on Nominal Forward Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa (continued)
Regression
Independent variable 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 7-11 7-12
Control variables
Oil price 0.052 0.027 0.017 0.031
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Equity premiumb −0.244 −0.275 −0.330 −0.370
(0.136) (0.134) (0.142) (0.168)
Defense spending/GDP 0.055 0.011 0.051 0.056
(0.275) (0.230) (0.235) (0.259)
Federal Reserve holdings  −0.367
of Treasuries (0.412)
Federal Reserve purchases  −0.786 −0.707 −0.615
of Treasuries (0.702) (0.733) (0.804)
Projected GDP growth rate −0.169 −0.078 −0.248 −0.265 0.273 0.274 0.042 0.011 0.228 0.393 0.372 0.335
(0.598) (0.443) (0.385) (0.378) (0.525) (0.370) (0.333) (0.378) (0.635) (0.551) (0.552) (0.594)
Expected inﬂationc 1.327 1.184 1.236 1.275 1.012 0.858 0.940 0.989 0.809 0.878 0.949 0.847
(0.172) (0.194) (0.179) (0.165) (0.151) (0.153) (0.149) (0.225) (0.278) (0.209) (0.203) (0.228)
Constant 2.740 4.057 5.088 7.874 1.678 3.939 5.340 7.671 4.103 3.989 4.883 0.668
(1.907) (0.875) (0.722) (3.774) (1.851) (0.739) (0.506) (5.871) (2.050) (1.157) (1.123) (6.100)
Adjusted R2 .813 .854 .853 .851 .854 .906 .903 .900 .914 .941 .938 .935
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic
Research; Federal Reserve.
a. Sample period for all regressions is 1976–2004. All projected variables are ﬁve-year projections. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of observations N = 29.
b. Deﬁned as in table 6.
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Table 8. Further OLS Estimates of the Effects of Projected Fiscal Variables on Real
Forward Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa
Regression
Independent variable 8-1 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5 8-6
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP −0.034 −0.038 −0.042 −0.046 −0.016 −0.017
(0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.043)
Projected primary 0.541 0.648 0.475
deﬁcit/GDP (0.176) (0.156) 0.177
Projected revenue/GDP −0.528 −0.661 −0.400
(0.212) (0.179) (0.275)
Projected primary 0.582 0.665 0.559
outlays/GDP (0.233) (0.224) (0.386)
Recession dummy and interactions
Recession dummy 1.036 −5.343 1.315 4.925
(1.366) (4.138) (0.825) (7.757)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.005 −0.008 −0.016 −0.013
debt/GDP (0.028) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.349 −0.163
primary deﬁcit/GDP (0.195) (0.156)
Recession dummy × projected 0.397 0.083
revenue/GDP (0.179) (0.268)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.026 −0.280
primary outlays/GDP (0.208) (0.279)
Control variables
Oil price 0.003 0.005
(0.020) (0.034)
Equity premiumb −0.354 −0.380
(0.152) (0.187)
Defense spending/GDP 0.077 0.015
(0.143) (0.167)
Federal Reserve purchases  −0.628 −0.561
of Treasuries (0.749) (0.844)
Projected GDP growth rate −0.133 −0.186 −0.446 −0.501 0.307 0.305
(0.440) (0.426) (0.277) (0.315) (0.601) (0.620)
Constant 7.235 6.547 8.429 8.676 5.947 3.337
(2.347) (4.848) (1.852) (3.994) (2.127) (5.651)
Adjusted R2 .416 .393 .662 .664 .761 .738
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income
and Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve.
a. Regressions are similar to those in table 6 except that at least two fiscal variables (one of which is projected debt) are
included in each equation. Sample period for all regressions is 1976–2004. All projected variables are five-year projections
except the debt-GDP ratio, which is a four-year projection. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of 
observations N = 29.
b. Deﬁned as in table 6.
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 163sures in year t + 5.147 In this “horse race” between stocks and flows, the
deficit variables dominate. Indeed, the coefficient on the projected debt
variable becomes statistically insigniﬁcant (and slightly negative), and the
estimated effect of the projected deficit increases: whereas in table 6 we
found an effect of 29 to 45 basis points for a 1-percent-of-GDP change in
the projected primary variable (primary deficit, primary outlays, or rev-
enue), table 8 shows an effect of 40 to 67 basis points once the analysis
controls for projected debt-GDP ratios. The recession interaction is sta-
tistically significant in one of the regressions (column 8-4, for the inter-
action with revenue), but insignificant in the others. Of the other variables,
only the equity premium remains statistically significant. The inclusion
of both debt and deficit variables produces similar results when, as in
table 7, the nominal forward interest rate is used as the dependent vari-
able and inflationary expectations are included on the right-hand side
(results not shown).
Table 9 shows results for the same speciﬁcation as in table 8 but using a
ﬁrst-order autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model for the estima-
tion, because some of the results (in particular, when the additional control
variables are included) suggest autocorrelated errors. In these regressions
the coefﬁcient on the projections of the primary deﬁcit, primary outlays, and
revenue ranges between 44 and 67 basis points. Again, the coefﬁcients on
the debt variables are generally small, negative, and statistically insigniﬁ-
cant, and some of the recession interaction terms are signiﬁcant. We high-
light the speciﬁcation in column 9-5 as something of a central estimate and
will use it as a baseline for our sensitivity analysis below. In that speciﬁca-
tion a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the primary deﬁcit projected ﬁve years
in the future raises current forward rates by 53 basis points, controlling for
a wide variety of other explanatory factors.148
PROJECTED FISCAL POLICY AND CURRENT LONG-TERM RATES. Table 10
shows regressions of the current real ten-year interest rate on projected
future fiscal variables. In the specifications that include (besides GDP
164 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
147. Using projected debt at the end of t + 5 and the deﬁcit in t + 5 would double-count
the deficit in t + 5. Likewise, using debt at the end of t + 4 and the unified deficit in t + 5
would effectively double-count interest payments in t + 5, since they are already implied by
the debt level at the end of t + 4.
148. Estimates of the speciﬁcations in tables 6 through 9 in ﬁrst-difference form led to
similar coefﬁcient estimates and large standard errors.
(text continues on page 69)
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Forward Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa
Regression
Independent variable 9-1 9-2 9-3 9-4 9-5 9-6
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP −0.029 −0.038 −0.047 −0.047 −0.013 −0.010
(0.031) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017) (0.019)
Projected primary deﬁcit/GDP 0.455 0.673 0.534
(0.225) (0.169) (0.113)
Projected revenue/GDP −0.442 −0.672 −0.508
(0.219) (0.171) (0.154)
Projected primary outlays/GDP 0.564 0.669 0.489
(0.227) (0.201) (0.213)
Recession dummy and interactions
Recession dummy 0.770 −5.549 0.512 1.688
(1.511) (3.597) (0.854) (4.807)
Recession dummy × 0.003 −0.003 0.013 0.015
projected debt/GDP (0.033) (0.029) (0.021) (0.022)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.385 −0.330
primary deﬁcit/GDP (0.231) (0.159)
Recession dummy × projected 0.423 0.295
revenue/GDP (0.213) (0.180)
Recession dummy × projected −0.051 −0.368
primary outlays/GDP (0.243) (0.245)
Control variables
Oil price −0.010 0.003
(0.020) (0.029)
Equity premiumb −0.447 −0.448
(0.118) (0.118)
Defense spending/GDP 0.029 0.032
(0.063) (0.085)
Federal Reserve purchases  −0.330 −0.297
of Treasuries (0.545) (0.585)
Projected GDP growth rate −0.150 −0.250 −0.484 −0.506 0.775 0.734
(0.429) (0.407) (0.213) (0.259) (0.560) (0.565)
Constant 6.941 5.388 8.748 8.871 5.365 5.448
(2.346) (4.761) (1.701) (3.375) (1.332) (3.147)
AR(1) coefﬁcient 0.331 0.346 −0.100 −0.061 −0.587 −0.588
(0.308) (0.280) (0.210) (0.214) (0.239) (0.232)
Wald χ2 52.409 56.816 419.014 71,263.451 2,751.599 39,603.831
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and
Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve.
a. Sample period for all regressions is 1976–2004. All projected variables are ﬁve-year projections except the debt-GDP ratio,
which is a four-year projection. Numbers in parentheses are semirobust  standard errors. Number of observations N = 29.
b. Deﬁned as in table 6.
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growth) only ﬁscal variables or only ﬁscal and recession variables (columns
10-1 through 10-8), the coefficients on the fiscal variables tend to be
somewhat smaller than when the forward long-term rate is used (table 6)
but are still statistically significant. For example, the coefficient on the
projected primary deficit is either 32 or 36 basis points. The coefficients
become smaller and statistically insignificant when the additional control
variables are included: the coefficient on the primary deficit falls to 
17 basis points.
Notably, Federal Reserve holdings or purchases of Treasury securities,
which did not affect forward long-term rates in tables 6 through 9, have
an economically significant and statistically precise effect on current
long-term rates in table 10 (and in tables 11 through 13). This suggests
that different factors may affect current long-term rates than affect for-
ward rates.
When current nominal long-term rates are used as the dependent vari-
able (table 11), projected unified deficits and projected primary deficits
each enter with a statistically significant coefficient of about 20 basis
points in the regressions that include all of the control variables (columns
11-10 and 11-11, respectively). When current real rates are used and 
both the projected debt and projected primary deﬁcit variables are included
(table 12), the estimated coefficient on the latter increases to over 
50 basis points in the specifications that include only fiscal variables or
only fiscal and recession variables, but this effect disappears in the
regressions that include all the control variables. The results are similar
when nominal rates are used and when an AR(1) model is estimated
(results not shown).
EFFECTS OF CURRENT FISCAL POLICY ON CURRENT LONG-TERM RATES.
Table 13 presents regressions of the real current long-term interest rate
on current fiscal variables. The fiscal variables are generally not statisti-
cally significant in these specifications, and they remain insignificant
when the nominal rate is used, when an AR(1) model is estimated, and
when both debt and deficit variables are entered simultaneously (results
not shown).
Sensitivity Analysis
Table 14 presents results of our sensitivity analysis on the risk measure
and the state-of-the-economy measure. The equity premium variable raises
(text continues on page 176)
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Table 12. Further OLS Estimates of the Effects of Projected Fiscal Variables on Real
Current Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa
Regression
Independent variable 12-1 12-2 12-3 12-4 12-5 12-6
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP −0.052 −0.062 −0.037 −0.050 0.019 0.017
(0.039) (0.041) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028) (0.037)
Projected primary  0.541 0.527 0.085
deﬁcit/GDP (0.276) (0.194) (0.198)
Projected revenue/GDP −0.504 −0.479 0.026
(0.344) (0.344) (0.348)
Projected primary 0.660 0.655 0.209
outlays/GDP (0.312) (0.281) (0.304)
Recession dummy and interactions
Recession dummy 3.677 −6.378 4.129 9.496
(2.272) (9.464) (1.102) (9.220)
Recession dummy × projected  −0.050 −0.056 −0.076 −0.072
debt/GDP (0.047) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024)
Recession dummy × projected −0.162 0.304
primary deﬁcit/GDP (0.309) (0.174)
Recession dummy × projected 0.180 −0.422
revenue/GDP (0.352) (0.335)
Recession dummy × projected 0.419 0.128
primary outlays/GDP (0.248) (0.248)
Control variables
Oil price 0.024 0.026
(0.033) (0.049)
Equity premiumb −0.547 −0.585
(0.200) (0.207)
Defense spending/GDP 0.238 0.147
(0.228) (0.242)
Federal Reserve purchases  −2.199 −2.100
of Treasuries (0.656) (0.787)
Projected GDP growth rate 0.073 −0.081 −0.251 −0.493 0.745 0.741
(0.559) (0.495) (0.342) (0.474) (0.837) (0.903)
Constant 6.611 4.615 6.654 4.636 1.868 −1.993
(3.199) (7.500) (2.347) (8.649) (2.297) (7.340)
Adjusted R2 .146 .119 .488 .537 .785 .767
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income
and Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve.
a. These regressions are similar to those in table 6 except that at least two fiscal variables (one of which is projected debt) are
included in each equation. Sample period for all regressions is 1976–2004. All projected variables are five-year projections
except the debt-GDP ratio, which is a four-year projection. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Number of 
observations N = 29.
b. Deﬁned as in table 6.
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a number of issues. A change in the ratio of the dividend yield to market
value could imply either a change in the return on all assets or a shift in
preferences for stocks versus bonds. In addition, the equity premium vari-
able includes a measure of the previous period’s long-term interest rates,
which might create endogeneity problems.149 We therefore examine the
effects of dropping the interest rate component of the equity premium—
and thus entering the dividend–market value ratio in lieu of the equity
premium—and of omitting both risk variables. The recession dummy
also raises some concerns, since it is discontinuous and takes the value
of 1 only in 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1991.150 To explore other options, we
perform regressions using the GDP gap, the unemployment rate, or no
control for the current state of the economy.151
Column 14-1 in table 14 reproduces the estimates from the regression
reported in column 9-5 of table 9, which includes both the recession
dummy and the equity premium. The next two columns use alternative
measures of the state of the economy, and column 14-4 uses none. Columns
14-5 through 14-8 repeat the first four specifications using the dividend
yield instead of the equity premium, and columns 14-9 through 14-12
include no risk measure. (Thus, column 14-12 includes no control for either
risk or the state of the economy.) In all twelve speciﬁcations, projected primary
deficits in year t + 5 have positive, precisely estimated, and substantial
impacts on forward long-term rates; in contrast, projected ratios of public
debt to GDP never show a positive significant effect. Controlling for the
GDP gap (columns 14-2, 14-6, and 14-10) generates fiscal policy effects
similar to those using the recession measure. Controlling for the unem-
ployment rate (columns 14-3, 14-7, and 14-11) generates very large effects
of deficits on interest rates. Not controlling for the state of the economy
(columns 14-4, 14-8, and 14-12) generates much smaller effects of ﬁscal
149. Laubach (2003) uses as an instrument for the equity premium variable the previous
period’s value of the term and ﬁnds that it does not affect his results.
150. The 2001 recession began in March and ended in November and thus did not over-
lap with either the January 2001 or January 2002 CBO forecasts.
151. The last specification follows that of Laubach (2003) and Engen and Hubbard
(2004). It is appropriate to note, however, that our goal in including the recession variable is
not just to control for the state of the economy, but also to explore whether the effects of
future projected ﬁscal policy outcomes were systematically different in a recession, perhaps
because participants in financial markets have shorter horizons during such periods. Con-
trolling for smoother measures, such as the GDP gap or the unemployment rate, may not pro-
vide as clean a test of that hypothesis.
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policy on interest rates. This suggests that, even when one examines for-
ward long-term rates, it is important to control for the current state of the
economy. Alternative specifications of the risk variable do not affect the
impact of projected ﬁscal policy on interest rates.
Table 15 examines the sensitivity of the results across time periods and
fiscal policy measures. Dropping the years after 2000 allows an analysis
that is independent of the Bush tax cuts and the recent recession. Dropping
the years before 1981 is interesting, because Christopher House shows that,
during the 1981–2004 period, the actual deﬁcit in year t is closely corre-
lated with the projection in that year of the deﬁcit in year t+5.152This raises
two key questions: First, to what extent are the results in tables 6 through
9 for the whole period due to potentially unusual patterns in the 1976–81
period? Second, are the central results for projected ﬁscal policy in those
tables merely masking the fact that current deficits affect future interest
rates and that projected deficits happen to proxy well for current deficits
during this period?153
To address the ﬁrst question, column 15-1 of table 15 again repeats the
results from column 9-5 in table 9, and columns 15-2 and 15-3 show results
of the same specification for different sample periods. The effect of pro-
jected ﬁscal policy on forward rates is similar in each of the three sample
periods: between 42 and 57 basis points for each 1-percent-of-GDP change
in the projected primary deﬁcit.154 This shows that the effects of projected
ﬁscal policy reported in tables 6 through 9 are not due just to the inclusion
of data for the 1976–81 period.155
152. See the comment by House following this paper.
153. The correlation between the deﬁcit in period t and the deﬁcit in period t + 5 that is
predicted in period t (both measured as a share of GDP) is 0.6 for the 1981–2004 period and
0.5 for 1976–2004. In contrast, the correlation between the actual deﬁcit in period t + 5 and
the period t + 5 deﬁcit predicted in period t is negative (between −.3 and −.5) in both peri-
ods. A regression of the projected ﬁve-year-ahead deﬁcit on the current deﬁcit yields a coef-
ficient of about 0.8 (t = 5) in each of the subperiods. A regression of the projected
five-year-ahead deficit on the actual outcome yields a coefficient less than 0.1 in absolute
value. See Cohen and Follette (2003) for a discussion of the difﬁculties in projecting ﬁscal
variables beyond a year or two.
154. This ﬁnding is consistent with Laubach’s (2003) ﬁnding that his results are not sen-
sitive to subperiods within the overall 1976–2004 sample period.
155. Note that the overall relationship between interest rates and ﬁscal policy could
evolve over time for a wide variety of reasons, including increasing openness of the economy
(which would tend to make the relationship weaker) and a broader use of government debt to
hedge mortgage-backed securities (which could tend to make the relationship stronger).
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The rest of table 15 addresses the second question. Columns 15-4
through 15-6 replace the projected fiscal policy controls with the current
uniﬁed deﬁcit, and columns 15-7 through 15-9 do the same using the cur-
rent standardized deﬁcit. These regressions show positive and signiﬁcant
effects of current deﬁcits on forward long-term rates, with effects ranging
between 30 and 45 basis points for a 1-percent-of-GDP change in the cur-
rent deﬁcit. These effects are almost as large as the effects of projected ﬁs-
cal policy shown in columns 15-1 through 15-3, and they highlight the
concern raised by House that current deﬁcits may be driving the results that
have been attributed to projected ﬁscal policy.
Columns 15-10 through 15-15 include both projected and current
deﬁcits. Column 15-12 shows that, for 1981–2004, the period highlighted
by House, current deficits have a substantial effect on forward rates—
41 basis points per percentage point of GDP—even when projected deﬁcits
are controlled for. This is an interesting and unexpected result, but it should
not detract from the ﬁnding that the impact of projectedprimary deﬁcits on
forward rates is still substantial: 48 basis points per percentage point of
GDP, compared with 53 basis points in column 15-1. Thus table 15 shows
that, even though current deﬁcits and the ﬁve-year-ahead projection of
deﬁcits move largely in tandem during the 1981–2004 period, projected
deﬁcits still have a large and independent effect on forward long-term rates,
even after controlling for current deﬁcits. This in turn implies that the results
in tables 6 through 9, linking projected ﬁscal policy and long-term forward
rates, are in no way an artifact of the tight relationship between current
deﬁcits and the projected ﬁve-year-ahead deﬁcit between 1981 and 2004,
nor are projected deﬁcits merely a proxy for current deﬁcits.156
Table 16 shows that the heightened sensitivity of interest rates to both
current and projected deﬁcits in the 1981–2004 period also holds in regres-
sions that examine the effects of projected fiscal policy on current long-
156. Other results in table 15 are also of interest. When we control for projected deﬁcits,
a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the current deficit raises forward long-term rates by about 
20 basis points in the 1976–2004 or the 1976–2000 period (columns 15-10 and 15-11,
respectively). A 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the projected primary deficit in year t + 5
raises forward rates by about 30 basis points. Columns 15-13 through 15-15 control for the
current standardized deﬁcit instead of the current uniﬁed deﬁcit. In stark contrast to columns
15-7 through 15-9, the current standardized deﬁcit appears to have no effect on forward long-
term interest rates across any of the time periods, once projected deﬁcits are included. Con-
trolling for the standardized deﬁcit raises the estimated impact of the projected primary deﬁcit
by 10 to 15 basis points, compared with the results that control for the current uniﬁed deﬁcit.
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Table 16. ARMA Estimates of the Effects of Projected and Current-Period Fiscal
Variables on Real Current Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa
Regression and sample period
16-1 16-2 16-3 16-4 16-5 16-6
1976– 1976– 1981– 1976– 1976– 1981–
Independent variable 2004 2000 2004 2004 2000 2004
Fiscal variables
Projected debt/GDP 0.028 0.004 −0.024
(0.035) (0.029) (0.015)
Projected primary 0.096 0.226 0.764
deﬁcit/GDP (0.152) (0.125) (0.121)
Current-period debt/GDP 0.001 −0.034 −0.003
(0.091) (0.049) (0.027)
Current-period primary −0.019 0.127 0.336
deﬁcit/GDP (0.215) (0.194) (0.155)
Recession dummy 
and interactions
Recession dummy 4.360 3.330 6.966 3.677 1.967 3.811
(1.117) (1.178) (0.877) (1.456) (1.468) (1.202)
Recession dummy ×− 0.083 −0.060 −0.120
projected debt/GDP (0.028) (0.025) (0.017)
Recession dummy × 0.311 0.173 −0.097
projected primary  (0.145) (0.122) (0.077)
deﬁcit/GDP
Recession dummy ×− 0.119 −0.074 −0.111
current-period (0.046) (0.039) (0.028) 
debt/GDP
Recession dummy × 1.308 0.772 0.911
current-period primary (1.262) (0.943) (0.440)
deﬁcit/GDP
Projected GDP  0.982 0.765 2.137
growth rate (1.080) (0.887) (0.403)
Current GDP growth rate 0.025 −0.112 0.055
(0.170) (0.170) (0.077)
Federal Reserve purchases  −2.815 −2.487 −2.694 −1.638 −1.565 −1.808
of Treasuries (1.547) (0.904) (0.494) (1.389) (0.808) (0.666)
Control variables
Oil price 0.019 0.023 −0.090 0.043 0.046 0.036
(0.034) (0.032) (0.026) (0.052) (0.034) (0.020)
Equity premiumb −0.540 −0.506 −1.005 −0.468 −0.601 −1.121
(0.163) (0.158) (0.098) (0.471) (0.260) (0.223)
Defense spending/GDP 0.169 0.071 0.334 0.398 0.071 0.263
(0.188) (0.170) (0.076) (0.355) (0.317) (0.126)
Constant 1.507 3.451 4.785 2.760 6.658 5.660
(continued)
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term rates (similar to tables 10 through 12) and the effects of current ﬁscal
policy on current long-term rates (similar to table 13). During the period
since 1981, a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in projected deﬁcits raises current
long-term rates by 76 basis points, and a 1-percent-of-GDP increase in the
current primary deficit raises current long-term rates by 33 basis points.
These results imply much stronger effects of projected and current fiscal
policy on current interest rates for this shorter period than tables 10 through
13 suggest for the whole 1976–2004 period.
Summary
In the preferred specifications (tables 8 and 9), which allow both debt
and deficits to affect interest rates, the estimated effect on forward long-
term rates from a 1-percent-of-GDP shift in projected primary budget vari-
ables ranges between 40 and 70 basis points, depending on the speciﬁcation
and on whether the fiscal variable is the primary deficit, or revenue and
primary outlays separately. Our effects are larger than those found by
Laubach and by Engen and Hubbard,157 because we include both projected
debt and projected deﬁcits as variables, and because we include measures
of whether the economy is currently in recession. The results show that the
effects of projected deﬁcits are largerwhen projected debt is included, and
157. Laubach (2003); Engen and Hubbard (2004).
Table 16. ARMA Estimates of the Effects of Projected and Current-Period Fiscal
Variables on Real Current Ten-Year Treasury Ratesa (continued)
Regression and sample period
16-1 16-2 16-3 16-4 16-5 16-6
1976– 1976– 1981– 1976– 1976– 1981–
Independent variable 2004 2000 2004 2004 2000 2004
(2.371) (2.231) (0.996) (5.596) (3.911) (1.922)
AR(1) coefﬁcient −0.258 −0.106 −0.844 0.191 0.302 −0.196
(0.561) (0.369) (0.168) (0.753) (0.404) (0.417)
No. of observations 29 25 24 29 25 24
Wald χ2 1,461.312 7,677.126 9,711.773 398.419 287.23 6,623.901
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from CBO; Laubach (2003); OMB; Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income
and Product Accounts; Financial Forecast Center; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve.
a. All projected variables are five-year projections except the debt-GDP ratio, which is a four-year projection. Numbers in
parentheses are semirobust standard errors.
b. Deﬁned as in table 6.
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that the effect of a given future deﬁcit tends to be larger if the economy is
currently not in a recession than if it is.
In sharp contrast, the projected debt-GDP ratio never exerts a positive
and signiﬁcant effect on future interest rates when it is entered in a regres-
sion that also includes projected deﬁcits. The projected deﬁcit thus seems
a more informative measure than projected debt. This is reﬂected in table 6,
where the deﬁcit-only equations had signiﬁcantly higher R2s than the debt-
only equations, and most strikingly in tables 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16, where,
when both variables are entered, deﬁcits have large effects and the debt has
virtually none.
Our estimates of the effect of an increase in the projected uniﬁed budget
deﬁcit are somewhat smaller–—25 to 35 basis points for each 1-percent-of-
GDP increase—than that of an increase in the primary deﬁcit. This should
be expected, since a shift of 1 percent of GDP in the primary deﬁcit would
represent a more dramatic change than a shift of 1 percent of GDP in the
uniﬁed deﬁcit. Finally, our results when debt is entered in the equation by
itself suggest that an increase in the projected debt by 1 percent of GDP
raises long-term rates by between 3 and 6 basis points.
All of the estimates above may understate the true effects for at least two
reasons. First, as Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai note,158 and as discussed earlier
in the paper, the effects would be larger if sustained deﬁcits cause investors
to lose conﬁdence in the ability of policymakers to avoid a ﬁscal crisis. Sec-
ond, because the projected ﬁscal policy variables are only approximations
of investors’ true expectations, the regressions may suffer from classical
measurement error, which would bias the coefﬁcient on projected deﬁcits
toward zero.
Conclusion
The empirical evidence presented in this paper indicates that federal
budget deficits reduce national saving and raise long-term interest rates.
Reasonable rules of thumb based on our estimates are that each 1-percent-
of-GDP increase in current deficits reduces national saving by 0.5 to 
0.8 percent of GDP, that each 1-percent-of-GDP increase in projected
future unified deficits raises forward long-term interest rates by 25 to 
35 basis points, and that each 1-percent-of-GDP increase in projected
158. Rubin, Orszag, and Sinai (2004).
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future primary deﬁcits raises forward long-term interest rates by 40 to 70
basis points.
These ﬁndings carry substantial implications. First, both the consump-
tion and the interest rate results reject the Ricardian view of the world. Sec-
ond, the interest rate results reject the small open economy view, at least
as it applies to the U.S. economy.
Third, the results suggest that the sustained ﬁscal deﬁcits now facing the
United States will impose signiﬁcant economic costs. Under the assump-
tions we have described, the uniﬁed budget deﬁcit over the next decade is
projected to average about 3.5 percent of GDP. Our results suggest that
these deﬁcits will reduce annual national saving by 2 to 3 percent of GDP.
As a result, by the end of the decade, the assets owned by Americans will
be roughly 20 to 30 percent of GDP less than they would be if the uniﬁed
budget were balanced over the next decade. With a rate of return on capital of
6 percent, those missing assets will reduce national income by 1 to 2 percent
in 2015 and each year thereafter.159 Our results also suggest that the increase
in uniﬁed deﬁcits will raise interest rates by 80 to 120 basis points.
Fourth, our results suggest that making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts per-
manent would raise the cost of capital for new investment, reduce long-
term investment, and reduce long-term economic growth. Tax cuts have
offsetting effects on the cost of new investment, with marginal tax rate cuts
reducing, and higher interest rates from deﬁcits increasing, the cost of cap-
ital. Gale and Samara Potter show that, if the 2001 tax cut were to raise
interest rates by 50 basis points, the cost of capital would rise for corpo-
rate equipment and structures, noncorporate equipment and structures,
and owner-occupied housing.160 By 2014 the 2001 tax legislation, if
extended past its official sunset, would increase the public debt by just
over $3.4 trillion,161 or about 19 percent of projected GDP in 2014. This
implies an interest rate increase of 57 basis points using the Engen and
Hubbard estimates,162and an even larger increase using our estimates. From
an alternative perspective, making the 2001 tax cut permanent would reduce
159. The assumption of a 6 percent rate of return is intended to be conservative, under-
stating the effects. If, for example, the rate of return were instead 12 percent, as assumed in
our benchmark calculation, the loss of national income would be 2 to 4 percent in 2015 and
each year thereafter.
160. Gale and Potter (2002).
161. This estimate is based on Joint Committee on Taxation (2001, 2002, 2003) revenue
ﬁgures for the original legislation, CBO estimates of the costs of extensions, and CBO inter-
est rate matrix calculations for debt service costs.
162. Engen and Hubbard (2004).
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 184revenue by about 1.7 percent of GDP on a permanent basis (assuming the
tax cuts are not effectively supplanted by the alternative minimum tax).
Using our estimates for primary deﬁcits, this implies that interest rates will
rise by 70 and 120 basis points. Both sets of estimates imply that the 2001
tax cut will end up reducing long-term investment. It might be thought that
the 2003 tax cut would have more beneﬁcial effects on investment, since it
focused on dividend and capital gains tax cuts. In recent work, however, we
show that the net effect of making the 2001 and the 2003 tax cuts perma-
nent would be to raise the cost of capital once the interest rate effects are
taken into account—even under the Engen-Hubbard estimates.163 These
ﬁndings imply that making the tax cuts permanent would reduce the long-
term level of investment, which is consistent with a negative effect on
national saving and on future living standards.
Finally, after 2014 the budget outlook grows steadily worse as costs
associated with federal retirement and health programs mount. Under rea-
sonable projections and in the absence of policy changes, the nation thus
faces a long period of sustained large budget deficits. In this context the
negative long-term effects of deficits presented in this paper, substantial
though they are, may provide an unduly auspicious perspective on the
adverse consequences of ﬁscal deﬁcits.
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 185
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Discussion
Eric M. Engen: Government debt and deficits matter. Although some
politicians may argue that deﬁcits do not affect the politics of public pol-
icy or voters’ behavior, government borrowing does affect the economy.
The disagreements among economists concerning government debt and
deﬁcits are primarily over the channels through which the effects occur and
the magnitude of those effects.
In this paper, William Gale and Peter Orszag review past and expected
future federal government borrowing and present a theoretical summary
of some of the different ways in which government debt can affect the
economy. They also contribute to the body of research on the economic
effects of government debt by providing new empirical estimates of two
channels through which these effects operate. First, they estimate the
degree to which private domestic saving may rise coincidently with
increased government borrowing. Second, they estimate the effect of 
federal government debt and deficits on interest rates. My discussion 
will focus first on their empirical analyses of the two channels and 
then turn to their more general discussion of the economic effects of 
government debt.
The ﬁrst part of the authors’ empirical analysis estimates both an aggre-
gate consumption function and an Euler equation speciﬁcation for changes
in aggregate household consumption spending. In both speciﬁcations they
estimate the impact of changes in debt-financed government taxes while
controlling for government spending, (lagged) government debt, marginal
tax rates on capital and labor, and other economic factors. This empirical
analysis contributes to the literature that studies whether households are more
Keynesian or more Ricardian in their reactions to government borrowing,
188
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cut as net wealth or as future tax obligations.
The authors’ results, using several different empirical specifications,
imply that households are neither purely Keynesian nor purely Ricardian.
In most of their regressions they find that, in the short run, a statistically
signiﬁcant portion of a debt-ﬁnanced tax cut is saved, but their estimates
of that response cover a fairly broad range. In their aggregate consumption
function specifications, with federal spending held constant, a one-dollar
decrease in federal tax payments is estimated to increase consumption
spending in the short run by 30 to 46 cents, implying that households off-
set 54 to 70 percent of the increase in federal borrowing by saving more.
The Euler equation estimates yield a much broader range of results, which
depend crucially on whether changes in consumption are measured in lev-
els or as a ratio to net national product, whether controls for marginal tax
rates are included, and whether explanatory variables are treated as endoge-
nous. In these estimates, with federal spending held constant, a one-dollar
decrease in federal tax payments is estimated to increase consumption
spending in the short run in the range of 22 to 98 cents, implying that
household saving offsets anywhere from 2 to 78 percent of the increase in
federal borrowing.
Although Gale and Orszag state that their preferred estimates suggest
that increases in private saving offset a much narrower 20 to 50 percent of
the increase in federal borrowing from a tax cut, it is difﬁcult a priori to rule
out any of their specifications, and readers may have their own prefer-
ences.1 Despite the authors’ improvements over many previous economet-
ric analyses of this issue, their broad range of estimates provides little
assurance that this analysis advances the consensus on the short-run mag-
nitude of this effect, even if we can safely rule out that households do not
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1. Recent analysis of the deficit-financed tax rebates in 2001 by Johnson, Parker, and
Souleles (2004) using household-level spending data suggests that about 50 to 70 percent of
these tax rebates were spent, on average, in the following two quarters. The results of this
short-run, household-level analysis of the 2001 tax rebate are consistent with the authors’
preferred range of estimates from their aggregate spending analysis. However, this deﬁcit-
ﬁnanced tax cut was implemented during a recession, and so it is not clear whether the results
of this study are more generally comparable to the effect of deﬁcit-ﬁnanced tax cuts in the
many nonrecession periods covered by Gale and Orszag’s aggregate data. Shapiro and Slem-
rod (2003) also investigate the effects of the 2001 tax rebate, and, although they do not use
the more detailed household-level spending data used in Johnson, Parker, and Souleles
(2004), they ﬁnd qualitatively similar results.
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authors note in discussing their results, these estimates do not address the
potential long-run effect of deficit-financed tax cuts on private saving,
which could differ from the short-run effect.
The second part of Gale and Orszag’s empirical analysis investigates the
effects of federal government debt and deficits on interest rates. Their
empirical research here is similar to recent studies by Thomas Laubach and
by Glenn Hubbard and myself.2 In general, their estimates of the effect of
the federal debt or deﬁcit on the level of the real interest rate are fairly sim-
ilar to what these other recent studies ﬁnd. Although the speciﬁcations vary
to some degree from paper to paper, all three ﬁnd that a 1-percentage-point
increase in the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce’s ﬁve-year-ahead projection
of federal debt relative to GDP increases the real ﬁve-year-ahead ten-year
Treasury rate by about 2 to 5 basis points. All three studies estimate that a
1-percentage-point increase in the CBO’s ﬁve-year-ahead projection of the
federal deﬁcit relative to GDP increases the real ﬁve-year-ahead ten-year
Treasury rate in a somewhat broader range, from 25 to 38 basis points. The
relative similarity of the results across these three papers stands in marked
contrast to the incredibly wide range of empirical estimates reported in the
earlier literature.
Where the papers part company, however, is over which speciﬁcation—
one that regresses the level of the interest rate on the level of federal debt,
or one that regresses it on the change in federal debt (that is, the level of
the deﬁcit)—is potentially more informative and more consistent with the
current state of macroeconomic analysis of this issue. Gale and Orszag
believe that the specification using the deficit is more informative. They
suggest that, if the change in the deﬁcit is perceived by ﬁnancial markets
as essentially permanent, or at least persistent, then the deﬁcit speciﬁcation
better captures the effects of this perception. Gale and Orszag basically
interpret these results in a manner consistent with Laubach’s reconciliation
of the differences between the debt-based and the deﬁcit-based approach.
Hubbard and I, in contrast, view the former (that is, the speciﬁcation relat-
ing the level of federal debt to the level of the interest rate) as both more
informative and more consistent with the current state of macroeconomic
theory. Moreover, we offer a different explanation for reconciling the dif-
ferent empirical results.
190 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
2. Laubach (2003); Engen and Hubbard (2004).
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been one that regresses the level of the interest rate on the deﬁcit. This spec-
ification comes from the relationship implied by a Keynesian IS-LM
framework. However, as Gregory Mankiw wrote in his review of the state
of macroeconomics over a decade ago, “The IS-LM model rarely ﬁnds its
way into scholarly journals: some economists view the model as a relic of
a bygone age and no longer bother to teach it. The large-scale macro-
econometric models are mentioned only occasionally at academic confer-
ences, often with derision.”3 Instead intertemporal models based on a
production function in which the interest rate is ultimately determined by
the level of the capital stock, and thus by the level of federal debt, are much
more conventional in current macroeconomic analysis.4 Examples include
the Solow growth model, the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model, and the Dia-
mond model as discussed in David Romer’s graduate macroeconomics
text;5 the overlapping-generations models presented in Olivier Blanchard
and Stanley Fischer’s macroeconomics text;6 and the general equilibrium
model used in the widely cited book on ﬁscal policy by Alan Auerbach and
Laurence Kotlikoff.7 In all of these types of macroeconomic models, the
interest rate is determined by the marginal product of capital and is a func-
tion of the level of the capital stock, which in turn is determined by federal
government debt rather than just the deﬁcit. Thus Hubbard and I suggest
that the econometric speciﬁcation that relates the level of government debt
to the level of the interest rate is more consistent with the current state of
macroeconomic theory than one that relates the level of the deﬁcit to the
level of the interest rate.8
Gale and Orszag as well as Laubach suggest that the speciﬁcation using
the deﬁcit is still informative if changes in the federal deﬁcit are perceived
by financial market participants to be very persistent. Indeed, if so, this
could help explain the larger interest rate effect estimated when the deﬁcit
is used. However, if projected deficits are persistent, this information
should also be reflected in a measure of projected federal debt, which
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3. Mankiw (1990, p. 1646).
4. Engen and Hubbard (2004) discuss such a model. This is the case even if other fea-
tures of the model yield more Keynesian, rather than classical, results. See Mankiw (1992).
5. Romer (1996).
6. Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
7. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987).
8. Engen and Hubbard (2004).
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jections for earlier years.
An alternative explanation for this difference in the estimated interest
rate effects is suggested in my paper with Hubbard. Because the Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce’s projections of federal deﬁcits are closely correlated
with their projections of federal debt (the correlation coefﬁcient is .89 with
both projections expressed as a percentage of GDP), the coefficient esti-
mate on the smaller deﬁcit component also picks up the effect of previously
accumulated government debt, and the coefficient estimate is larger than
when total government debt is used. Thus the larger interest rate effect esti-
mated using the deﬁcit speciﬁcation may reﬂect not the implied persistence
of deficit projections by financial market participants, but rather a mis-
speciﬁed model.
Gale and Orszag’s discussion of the potential effects of government bor-
rowing makes many other interesting and thoughtful points concerning gov-
ernment debt that are beyond the scope of my comments here. However, I
will conclude with two related points about the overall picture for future ﬁs-
cal policy and federal borrowing in the United States that the paper does not
emphasize. First, much of the emphasis in this paper on these future devel-
opments focuses on the recent tax cuts. However, future government bor-
rowing will in all likelihood be determined more by what happens with
spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid. Moreover, the his-
tory of federal tax policy in the United States shows that whereas legisla-
tion to adjust taxes is passed frequently, and that tax increases are not
uncommon, entitlement reform occurs far less frequently. Particularly rare
are changes in entitlements that reduce rather than increase their projected
growth.
Second, federal borrowing is not the only feature of ﬁscal policy that has
macroeconomic impacts. Both the level and the structure of government
taxes and spending can also have significant effects. If the fiscal gap is
closed in the years ahead by raising taxes, particularly taxes on labor and
capital, the negative effect on the economy will likely be much greater than
if the ﬁscal gap were closed by reforming entitlement spending. The type
and mix of policies ultimately used to reduce the ﬁscal gap are at least as
important as reducing the expected future government borrowing associ-
ated with current ﬁscal policy.
192 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:2004
2581-02_Gale_Redo.qxd  1/18/05  13:15  Page 192Christopher L. House: How do budget deficits affect the economy? This
is the central question in this paper by William Gale and Peter Orszag,
and, not surprisingly, it is a difficult question to answer. Moreover, since
the deficit is simply spending minus revenue, the answer to this question
seems to require answers to two other questions: How do taxes affect the
economy? And how does government spending affect the economy? To
isolate the effects of deficits, Gale and Orszag cast their question in terms
of Ricardian equivalence.
Ricardian equivalence says that, if the government cuts taxes today but
commits itself to increase future taxes by an amount equal to the capital-
ized value of the tax cut, there should be no effect on economic activity. A
tax change that has no effect on the present discounted value of taxes—that
is, a policy that changes only the timing of tax collection—is very special.
Here I will refer to such a tax cut as a Ricardian tax cut. Ricardian tax cuts
are the only tax cuts that leave a consumer’s permanent income unchanged,
and thus a deﬁcit caused by a Ricardian tax cut has no effect on the econ-
omy. Of course, Ricardian equivalence holds only under certain condi-
tions: consumers must be rational and forward looking, they must have
access to loan markets, taxes cannot be distortionary, and so on. However,
the basic message of Ricardian equivalence is clear: there is no direct con-
nection between deﬁcits and economic activity.
To assess whether Ricardian equivalence is a good approximation for
policy analysis in the real world, Gale and Orszag examine two statistical
relationships: the reaction of aggregate consumption to tax changes, and
the relationship between deﬁcits and interest rates. Ricardian equivalence
says that neither consumption nor the real interest rate should respond to
deﬁcits caused by a Ricardian tax cut.
To examine the relationship between aggregate consumption and bud-
get deﬁcits, Gale and Orszag estimate a consumption function of the form
where ∆ is the difference operator (∆x = xt − xt−1). Because they include
government spending ∆Gt in the regression, the coefﬁcient on government
revenue ∆Tt gives the partial correlation between government surpluses
and consumption. They ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on ∆Tt is negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. An increase in taxes of 1 percent of GDP is associated
with a reduction in consumption of between 0.5 and 0.8 percent of GDP.
The systematic reaction of consumption to variations in taxes, controlling
() , 1 01 2 3 ∆∆ ∆ ∆ CY T G e tt t t t =+ + + ++ ββ β β L
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Ricardian view.
There are two challenges to a causal interpretation of regression esti-
mates of equation 1, however. The first is that Ricardian equivalence
applies only to Ricardian tax cuts. Tax changes that affect permanent
income will typically cause changes in consumption when they occur. In
other words, even if the world were Ricardian, there would be no reason to
expect the coefﬁcient on ∆Tt to be zero.
The second problem, not wholly unrelated to the ﬁrst, is that the right-
hand-side variables are endogenous. Omitted variables that are correlated
with both ∆Tt and ∆Ct (and thus in the error) may cause the estimated coef-
ﬁcients to be biased from their true structural values.
It is instructive to consider an idealized environment inwhichequation 1
flows directly from maximizing behavior and in which Ricardian equi-
valence is known to hold. For speciﬁcity, suppose that in each period a 
consumer maximizes lifetime utility subject to a budget constraint
where A denotes the consumer’s current real assets. Income (Y) and taxes
(T) are uncertain but depend on a set of forecasting variables Xt, which could
include lagged values of Y, T,and so forth. The solution to this optimization
problem is a state-dependent consumption function C = c(Y, T, X, A). That
C depends on Y, T, and A is not surprising. Because it forecasts future lev-
els of after-tax income, X also inﬂuences C.
Although the precise form of the consumption function depends on the
form of the utility function, the stochastic process for income and so forth,
we can approximate it to obtain a linear equation similar to equation 1:
If this consumer is a representative consumer, this is the aggregate con-
sumption function, cy is the aggregate marginal propensity to consume
(MPC) out of current income Y,and cT, the coefﬁcient that Gale and Orszag
focus on, is the aggregate MPC from a tax cut. The standard Keynesian
assumption is that cy is between zero and 1 and that cT =− cy.
Ricardian equivalence holds in this setting. Faced with a Ricardian tax
cut, the consumer will not alter his or her consumption spending at all.
Importantly, however, this does not imply that cTis zero. In fact, it is almost
() . 2 0 ∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ Ccc Yc Tc c A ty t T t x t a t =+ + + + X
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change in taxes that signals a permanent change in after-tax income would
cause the consumer to rationally alter his or her spending.
In reality, many tax changes have this property. For instance, consump-
tion should react to a “peace dividend” like that at the end of the cold war.
Such a tax change is associated with projected reductions in future gov-
ernment spending and thus might have an effect on the consumer’s per-
manent income. Tax cuts intended to “starve the beast”—that is, that
reduce revenue in order to force reductions in spending—might also be
perceived to have a permanent impact on the consumer’s after-tax income.
The tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 are intended to be permanent. Even if they
are not, there is no implicit or explicit plan to recover the forgone revenue
with higher future taxes. If people believe that the budget will be balanced
in part through spending cuts, consumption should increase.
In general, the sign of cT depends not on whether Ricardian equivalence
holds, but rather on the relationship between current tax changes and future
tax changes. If current tax changes always come with the assurance of off-
setting future tax changes (that is, if the projected path of government spend-
ing is unchanged) then cT = 0. Otherwise cT ≠ 0. In particular, cT < 0 is
entirely consistent with Ricardian behavior. At a basic level, the problem is
whether the regression adequately controls for future changes in govern-
ment spending. Although equation 1 includes current and lagged government
purchases, it is not clear whether this is enough to test Ricardian equivalence.
The second issue with the estimation of equation 1 is the endogeneity
problem. Unless all of the relevant X variables are included in the regres-
sion, it is likely that the OLS coefﬁcients will be biased. If all of the rele-
vant variables in X were known, the estimated equation would ﬁt perfectly
and the correct structural parameters could be estimated.
To deal with the endogeneity problem, Gale and Orszag use an instru-
mental variables procedure that builds on the approach taken by Robert Hall
and by John Campbell and Gregory Mankiw.1Campbell and Mankiw’s pro-
cedure takes advantage of the fact that, under fairly general conditions, the
permanent income hypothesis (PIH) implies that the change in consumption
from one period to the next is uncorrelated with past information. Put dif-
ferently, consumption does not respond to anticipated changes in dispos-
William G. Gale and Peter R. Orszag 195
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any lagged variable that is correlated with current taxes is a valid instrument.
The basic approach considers an environment with both forward-
looking (Ricardian) consumers and “rule-of-thumb” consumers.2 The
forward-looking consumers behave according to the PIH, whereas the
rule-of-thumb consumers are assumed to simply consume their dispos-
able income (c = y − T). If λ is the fraction of rule-of-thumb consumers,
it is easy to show that aggregate consumption obeys
where Cov(Zt−1, vt) = 0 for any lagged variable Zt−1. Thus any Zt−1 is poten-
tially a valid instrument. The identiﬁcation problem from this approach is
quite subtle, however. Although lagged variables are valid instruments,
they do not identify the aggregate MPC. Instead they identify λ, the frac-
tion of non-Ricardian agents. The aggregate MPC out of taxes is the sum
of the MPC for the Ricardian agents (what I called cT above) and the MPC
for the rule-of-thumb consumers, which is 1 by assumption. The aggregate
MPC, which is what Gale and Orszag care about, is then
Thus λ is equal to the aggregate MPC only if cT = 0, which brings us back
to the ﬁrst point: even if Ricardian equivalence holds, the MPC out of taxes
is not generally zero; only if all tax changes were Ricardian would cT = 0.
A natural question then arises as to whether one can use lagged variables
as instruments for a model with only Ricardian (that is, PIH) consumers.
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is no. Although these are valid
instruments, they are not useful. The PIH says that Et (∆Ct+1) = 0 and that
Cov(∆Ct+1, Zt) = 0. If an instrumental variables regression of the change in
consumption on the change in income yields a nonzero coefﬁcient, the PIH
can be rejected. Unfortunately, the validity of the instruments must also be
rejected, since they rely directly on the PIH being true.
Empirically addressing whether the economy is Ricardian appears to
require a special instrument—specifically, it requires an instrument for a
Ricardian tax cut. Put differently, to know how consumers respond to
changes in the timing of taxes, one must observe their reaction to such
policies.
MPC =− () + 1 λλ cT .
∆∆ ∆ CY T v tt t t =− [] + λ ,
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tistical correlation between real interest rates and budget deficits. They
make no claim that their results are causal or structural; rather they conﬁne
themselves to investigating whether a strong statistical relationship exists
between deﬁcits and interest rates. To answer this question they consider a
variety of regressions of real interest rates on measures of the deﬁcit as a
percentage of GDP. The regressions include cyclical indicators and other
covariates.
Their main ﬁnding is that one gets very different answers depending on
whether real interest rates are regressed on current deﬁcits or on expected
future deﬁcits. They ﬁnd that expected future deﬁcits have a strong posi-
tive correlation with real interest rates, whereas current actual deﬁcits do
not. Although the partial correlation between current deﬁcits and real inter-
est rates is positive, it is typically not statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding
has intuitive appeal. Interest rates are inherently forward looking and, as a
result, undoubtedly incorporate expectations about future pressures in the
lending market. This explanation is particularly appealing if the deficit
forecasts contain signiﬁcant information beyond the simple correlation of
deﬁcits at time t with deﬁcits at time t + k.
The interpretation that the authors’ ﬁnding is due to the forward-looking
nature of interest rates is quite plausible. Moreover, several alternative expla-
nations can be ruled out. For instance, since high current interest rates would
increase future interest payments, one might expect that reverse causality
could lead to such a ﬁnding. Gale and Orszag show, however, that their ﬁnd-
ing remains intact if they use the primary deﬁcit instead (that is, if they
exclude debt service). Another possibility is that the CBO’s budget forecasts
are systematically optimistic, and thus a projected future deﬁcit is indica-
tive of a much larger current deﬁcit. A simple examination of the dynamic
relationship between current and future deﬁcits reveals that, although this
effect may be present to some extent, it cannot explain the authors’ results.
There are two reasons to doubt the “forward looking” interpretation.
First, from a purely numerical point of view, the main difference between
current deﬁcits and projected deﬁcits, and thus the main difference between
the two regression results, comes from only a handful of observations. Pro-
jected deﬁcits and current actual deﬁcits track each other closely for most
of the sample period. However, early in the sample (from 1976 to 1981),
there are a few sharp differences between the CBO’s deﬁcit projections and
the current deﬁcit. If those observations are dropped from the sample, the
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the correlation between projected deﬁcits and real interest rates.
Second, an essential component of the “forward looking” interpretation
is the notion that CBO forecasts are informative about future budget deﬁcits.
Surprisingly, the sample correlation between projected deﬁcits and actual
realized future deﬁcits is negative. Put differently, one might do better by
guessing the opposite of the CBO forecast. It is important not to overstate
this negative correlation, however. Like the contemporaneous correlation
between projected deﬁcits and current deﬁcits, much of the negative cor-
relation comes from only a few observations.
Neither of these observations invalidates Gale and Orszag’s basic ﬁnd-
ing, but both suggest that the interpretation of the correlation must be made
with care. In the end, Gale and Orszag have only a limited amount of data
on which to base their conclusion. Whether their ﬁnding is due to the fact
that interest rates are forward looking and thus anticipate expected future
borrowing is ultimately not clear.
It should be emphasized that, even if the world were Ricardian, there
would still be good reasons to be concerned about deﬁcits. Properly man-
aged budget deﬁcits increase the efﬁciency of the economy by smoothing
distortionary tax rates over time.3 The government should borrow when
spending is above average or revenue is below average. When spending is
low or revenue is high, the government should save. If, however, because
of poor planning or a lack of political willpower, the government does the
opposite, it will find itself in the undesirable position of having to raise
taxes dramatically just when it most needs the revenue.
In a non-Ricardian world, the inefﬁciencies associated with poorly man-
aged government debt are magnified. In addition to suffering inefficient
variations in distortionary tax rates, ﬁrms may be forced to abandon eco-
nomically viable investment projects so that the government’s spending
can be ﬁnanced.
On the whole, although it is far from conclusive, the evidence presented
by Gale and Orszag casts doubt on the Ricardian view of government bud-
get debt and deﬁcits. Taken literally, the paper says that an increase in deﬁcit
ﬁnancing of 1 percent of GDP reduces national saving by roughly half of a
percent of GDP and raises interest rates by roughly 30 basis points. Eco-
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we should indeed be worried about the current path of the federal budget.
General discussion: Benjamin Friedman emphasized that the authors’
coefficient estimates relating the real interest rate to the debt-GDP ratio
might appear to be small but in fact implied substantial effects of deficits
on capital formation. He reminded the Panel that fiscal policy during 
the Reagan administration raised the debt-GDP ratio by approximately 
25 percentage points, which, given the paper’s estimates, corresponds to
a 75-basis-point increase in real interest rates. Such an increase would be
quite large both by historical standards and compared with the curvature of
the production function. If, in equilibrium, the real marginal product of
capital corresponds to the real interest rate, then the former will also be
increased by 75 basis points, which would require a very large reduction in
capital intensity unless the elasticity of substitution is much smaller than
usually assumed. Friedman also pointed out that the latest CBO baseline
projection of future deficits, which implies only a small increase in the
debt-GDP ratio and thus a small impact on real interest rates, is mislead-
ing. After making the authors’ adjustments to the CBO baseline projection,
the implied future debt-GDP ratio is much larger, and the estimated impact
on real interest rates is substantial. Referring to Christopher House’s com-
ment on the paper, Friedman pointed out that there is no practical differ-
ence between, on the one hand, a world where tax cuts will be undone as
assumed in the Ricardian model but the behavior of consumers is not
Ricardian and, on the other, a world where behavior is Ricardian but the
tax cuts are not undone. Therefore, when one is thinking about the effects
of actual U.S. ﬁscal policy, this distinction is unimportant.
Some panelists questioned whether the results reported in the paper
should be expected to hold during periods of ﬁscal stress. Lars Svensson
noted that Ricardian equivalence would not normally hold, but he cited the
Swedish example of the early 1990s, when consumption dropped and sav-
ing increased dramatically in the face of a large ﬁscal deﬁcit. He reasoned
that people then viewed the fiscal situation as unsustainable and, fearing
that it would soon lead to a reduction of benefits or an increase in taxes,
started saving for that rainy day. Under such circumstances, Ricardian
equivalence may be more likely. Austan Goolsbee argued that the effect of
the fiscal position on interest rates would not be linear in a crisis and so
could not be inferred from the authors’ estimates. The experience of coun-
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interest rates until the sustainability of the debt comes into question, at
which point interest rates increase dramatically. He thought it was impor-
tant to understand why the large debts and deﬁcits in the United States in
the 1940s and in Japan in recent years had so little effect on interest rates,
and under what circumstances that might change. Goolsbee also pointed
out that projections of future deficits make assumptions about several
important factors, such as income growth and the rate of return on equities,
that are also important to current consumption. He suggested that, rather
than use such projections, the effects of future revenue growth be estimated
using the tax rates called for in legislation as instruments.
Olivier Blanchard was skeptical of the paper’s Euler equation tests of
Ricardian equivalence. In the end, such a test involves regressing the
change in consumption on the change in income, the change in taxes, and
some other factors that usually are not signiﬁcant. However, the change in
taxes is likely to proxy for the change in spending, so that it is hard to inter-
pret its coefﬁcient. For this and other reasons, he found it hard to believe
the results of such a test. Blanchard noted that several papers have found
effects on consumption from the timing of tax payments, but such results
are of limited use if one is interested in the effects of large deﬁcits on the
economy over many years. The high correlation between national saving
and federal saving that is apparent in the authors’ ﬁgure 6 does not imply
causality, because so many factors affect both public and private saving.
However, the relation might be tested using an instrument that, under the
assumption of Ricardian equivalence, would not affect national saving
except through public saving. Candidates for such an instrument might be
ﬁscal rules such as Gramm-Rudman-type spending caps or a variable iden-
tifying the political party in power.
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